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INTRODUCTION
More than fifty years ago, the legal scholars Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks famously observed that ―[t]he hard truth of
the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.‖1 To be sure, it would be an exaggeration to present the enterprise of statutory interpretation as wholly
chaotic. In practice, there is widespread agreement on the centrality of statutory text, there is an established toolkit of interpretive canons, and there are enduring frameworks that structure courts‘ statutory analyses. Still, commentators agree that
Hart and Sacks‘s observation about the unsettled state of statutory interpretation remains apt today.2
Yet while an absence of consensus in statutory interpretation is nothing new, it seems that people have lately become
less content with this state of affairs. Indeed, one of the more
interesting recent developments in the field of statutory interpretation has been the growing chorus of calls for more structure and predictability in interpretive methodology. In particular, several scholars have called for treating interpretive
methodology as binding law that should be honored as a matter
of stare decisis.3 That is, just as the Supreme Court might de1. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., West Academic 1994) (1958).
2. E.g., KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 43 (2013); Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 855 (2013).
3. E.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1866–67 (2008); Jordan
Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare
Decisis As Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 708–14
(2008); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology As “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1909–18 (2011)
(discussing whether interpretive methodology is binding law); Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085, 2145–56 (2002) (arguing for the codification of binding interpretive
rules).
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cide in a particular case whether a bicycle is a ―vehicle‖ within
the meaning of some statute, so too should the Court decide,
with precedential force that would bind itself and the lower
courts, whether legislative history may be used to resolve statutory ambiguities, whether one particular dictionary is more
authoritative than another, when to apply a presumption
against federal preemption of state law, and the like.
A second budding line of inquiry in the field of statutory
interpretation concerns the empirical realities of statutory interpretation in courts that are not the U.S. Supreme Court. The
usual academic focus on the Supreme Court has meant that we
do not know very much about the interpretive practices of the
lower federal courts and the state courts, but thankfully this is
starting to change. To choose two notable contributions, Abbe
Gluck has shed light on interesting developments in several
states, and Frank Cross has tracked some broad patterns of interpretive methodology in the federal courts of appeals.4
This Article explores the fruitful, yet largely uncharted,
territory found at the intersection of the two lines of inquiry
just described. That is, it considers the relationship between
the Supreme Court‘s methodological practices, haphazard and
inconsistent as they sometimes are, and the behavior of other
courts. More specifically, this Article concerns whether and
how the lower federal courts respond to changes in the Supreme Court‘s interpretive practices.5 Instructions and diseases
are both communicable in their different ways, but what about
the Supreme Court‘s canons of interpretation? When there are
discernable trends in the Supreme Court‘s practices, do the
lower courts‘ practices tend to move in parallel? When the Supreme Court modifies a particular interpretive canon, invents a
new one, or disapproves an old one, how do the lower courts
tend to react? What factors—regarding the Court‘s opinion, the
nature of the canon involved, or other contextual considerations—affect the lower courts‘ behavior?
4. FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
PRETATION 180–200 (2009); Abbe R. Gluck, The States

STATUTORY INTERAs Laboratories of
Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified
Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1771–1811 (2010).
5. My focus on the federal courts is not meant to deny that the state
courts are interesting and important; certainly they are more important numerically. But studying the state courts introduces some additional complications, see infra note 21, and so it makes sense to begin with the lower federal
courts. Future work might study how state courts respond to the U.S. Supreme Court and to their own state supreme court.
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Answering such questions about the linkages between different courts‘ interpretive regimes would be valuable for two
reasons. First, the answers would be interesting in their own
right, as they would contribute to our still-nascent understanding of the lower courts‘ behavior. The vast majority of the cases
in the federal system are decided in the lower courts, so the
Supreme Court cannot meaningfully change the interpretive
regime without their assistance. Yet we still know relatively
little about the lower courts‘ interpretive practices and how
those practices correspond (or do not) to those of the Supreme
Court. Second, a fuller understanding of current lower-court
behavior can help us evaluate the movement for a more formal
system of methodological stare decisis. Examining how the lower courts respond to the Supreme Court‘s signals today might
help us estimate the likely effects and benefits were the courts
to develop a more strictly precedential approach in the future.
The Article unfolds as follows:
Part I briefly situates this project within the existing debates over interpretive uniformity and methodological stare decisis. It also addresses my approach to selecting the Article‘s
set of case studies of interpretive change.
Part II begins the study of how canons are communicated
through the judicial system by examining some large-scale patterns over the last several decades. Existing evidence shows
that the Supreme Court and the lower courts tended to move
roughly in parallel with regard to several aspects of their interpretive approaches. I present some new evidence of parallelism. Specifically, as the Supreme Court became more favorably
disposed toward textualist tools like linguistic canons in recent
decades, so did the lower courts.
The next several parts then turn the focus toward more
particular episodes and issues in canonical evolution. Sometimes the Supreme Court invents a new canon or modifies an
old one; sometimes it lets a canon fall into disuse. When the
Court changes its interpretive regime in these kinds of ways,
that event creates an opportunity to observe how the lower
courts respond. The results reveal a variety of dynamics and
patterns, some expected but others quite surprising. As Part III
shows, the lower courts have the capacity, given the right conditions, to catch on very quickly to changes in the Supreme
Court‘s interpretive regime. In other situations, illustrated in
Part IV, canons seem rather impervious to modification. In still
other instances, one finds zombie canons that linger in the low-
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er courts despite their demise in the Supreme Court (Part V.A)
or canons that take off in the lower courts like pathogens escaped from the lab (Part V.B). Part VI addresses the issue of
how an idea crystallizes into an interpretive canon. The investigations undertaken in Parts III through VI draw on a range
of interpretive canons and doctrines, including linguistic canons such as ejusdem generis and the rule of the last antecedent,
substantive canons governing civil-rights statutes and jurisdictional statutes, the doctrines governing judicial deference to
agency interpretations, and the ―no elephants in mouseholes‖
rule.
With the benefit of the investigations just described, Part
VII then draws some tentative lessons about how canons propagate through the system and which features—of the canons, of
the lower courts, and of the broader institutional context beyond the judiciary—either enhance or inhibit accurate communication. Although this Article‘s case studies can identify factors that plausibly have generalizable effects, one overriding
conclusion is that the interpretive regime is a complicated system about which we still have only a very partial understanding. Modifying the interpretive regime is not a simple matter of
top-down instruction from the Supreme Court to lower courts
but rather involves multiple potentially relevant actors and
factors whose interactions defy simple explanations. The findings also illustrate the limits of the movement to give interpretive methodology more binding precedential effect. Specifically,
that movement appears to underestimate the degree to which
the system already displays forms of methodological precedent
as a practical matter, to misunderstand the factors preventing
the system from displaying more precedential behavior, and, as
a result, to overestimate the potential for formally binding
rules to improve the system.
I. INCONSISTENCY AND AUTHORITY IN INTERPRETIVE
METHODOLOGY
This Part frames the inquiry by providing some brief comments on interpretive methodology and stare decisis and then
explaining my own research methods.
A. METHODOLOGY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This Article concerns the judicial methodology of statutory
interpretation—that is, how courts approach questions about
the meaning of statutory text. The focus on the interpretation
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of statutes, rather than constitutions or other legal texts, is appropriate for a few reasons. First, although some principles apply to the interpretation of any instrument (e.g., read the text
as a whole), statutory interpretation in particular has a rich
toolkit consisting of scores of rules ranging from linguistic canons (noscitur a sociis, in pari materia, and so on) to substantive
presumptions (like the rule that Congress is presumed not to
legislate extraterritorially) to rules about the use of extrinsic
sources (such as rules governing the force of legislative history
and administrative guidance).6 Second, occasions for statutory
interpretation confront both the Supreme Court and the lower
courts routinely.7 By contrast, it is quite rare for the lower
courts to engage in genuine constitutional interpretation: most
areas of constitutional law are so thick with Supreme Court
case law that the lower courts‘ analyses are almost entirely devoted to parsing the relevant precedents.8 Therefore, for a
study of how lower courts‘ methodologies respond to the Supreme Court‘s practices, statutory interpretation is the most
promising focus.
Interpretive methodologies do not determine bottom-line
case outcomes in a clear way. Judges who disagree about the
proper interpretive approach often converge on the same answer in a given case, such that their methodological disagreement was inconsequential. At the same time, agreement on
matters of interpretive method does not guarantee agreement
on particular results.9 Therefore, one does not have to be an extreme skeptic about judicial rhetoric to acknowledge that it is
hard to know how changes in the interpretive rules affect outcomes. The Supreme Court‘s famous Chevron decision10 estab6. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1195–215 (5th
ed. 2014) (listing scores of interpretive doctrines and canons used by the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts).
7. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Informing the Public About the U.S. Supreme Court’s Work, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 282 (1998) (pointing out that the
majority of issues in front of the federal courts are issues of statutory interpretation).
8. See Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior”
Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843,
849–50 (1993).
9. See Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy?
An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 882
(2006) (finding, in a study of the Seventh Circuit, that differences in interpretive approach did not explain the disagreements in the few cases in which the
judges disagreed).
10. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
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lished an extraordinarily influential doctrinal framework for
assessing the validity of agency statutory interpretations, and
so one would think that Chevron, of all things, must affect outcomes. And yet it is difficult to prove that Chevron increased
the amount of leeway courts afford agency interpretations.11
Nonetheless, even if one cannot easily draw a straight line
between interpretive methodology and bottom-line outcomes,
the methodology used by lower courts—and how their methodology responds to the Supreme Court‘s signals—still matters
for numerous reasons. The governing interpretive regime structures the courts‘ analyses and emphasizes certain factors and
arguments over others, thereby making certain decisional
pathways easier or tougher to follow.12 And even if there were
no ultimate impact on case outcomes, the interpretive regime
affects how judges justify their decisions and how attorneys
must advocate for positions, both of which are important in
their own right.13
B. METHODOLOGICAL INCONSISTENCY AND METHODOLOGICAL
STARE DECISIS
Our Supreme Court Justices differ in their approaches to
statutory interpretation. Textualists like Justice Scalia and eclectic purposivists like Justice Breyer disagree over such things
as the relative importance of dictionary meanings versus legislative purposes, how to incorporate consideration of practical
consequences, and so forth—and these disagreements stem in
part from deeper divisions over the judge‘s place in the constitutional structure.14 In addition, even the same Justice might
display some variation in his or her own methods from case to
case, such as by invoking a certain presumption in one case but
not another or relying on a legalistic definition one day but fa(1984).
11. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION 772–75 (2d ed. 2013) (summarizing the empirical evidence).
12. Cf. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes
in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 305–06, 308–
10 (2002) (describing ―jurisprudential regimes‖—the frameworks that structure and influence judicial decision making by mediating between case facts
and outcomes).
13. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in
Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998).
14. See Jerry Mashaw, As if Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685,
1686 (1988) (―Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about
constitutional law.‖).
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voring a popular meaning the next. The Court as a whole is accordingly inconsistent in its methodology, as many have complained.15
Still, mere disagreement among the Justices may not fully
explain the Court‘s methodological inconsistency. The Justices
disagree about many things, and yet the law itself can still be
mostly predictable and consistent because the Justices do not
approach every legal question from scratch. Stare decisis is not
absolute on the Supreme Court,16 but it is the norm, and as a
practical matter prior decisions are routinely followed. (For the
Supreme Court, this adherence to precedent primarily manifests itself through case selection rather than through positive
reaffirmation of prior holdings: the Court ordinarily does not
review cases just to reiterate settled points of law.)
The Court‘s methodological inconsistency arises, then, not
just from pluralism and disagreement but also from its inability or unwillingness to give ordinary stare decisis effect to questions of interpretive methodology. The Court regards a particular case as authoritatively resolving a particular question—e.g.,
is a houseboat a ―vessel‖ within the meaning of a certain statute?—but the Court does not, or at least not to the same degree, regard that case as settling various questions of interpretive approach that might arise along the way—e.g., whether
meaning is fixed at the time of enactment or can evolve in light
of current needs, whether judges should adhere more to legislative purposes or dictionary definitions, which dictionary is preferred, and so on.17
Now, one should not exaggerate the degree of methodological inconsistency on display. Even without formally binding
precedent, there is common ground and a degree of regularity
to judicial interpretive practices. Purposivists and intentionalists, just like textualists, ordinarily regard the statutory text as
15. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
16. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (―Stare decisis is not
an inexorable command . . . .‖).
17. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 3, at 1872–84 (explaining that the Supreme Court does not give decisions about interpretive methodology ordinary
binding effect); Gluck, supra note 3, at 1910 (―[T]he Court does not generally
give formal stare decisis effect to its statements about statutory interpretation
methodology.‖); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 389 (2005) (―[W]hen
the Court issues opinions interpreting statutes, stare decisis effect attaches to
the ultimate holding as to the meaning of the particular statute interpreted,
but not to the general methodological pronouncements, no matter how apparently firm.‖).
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the most important source.18 There are dozens of familiar textual and substantive canons (ejusdem generis, the ―whole act‖
rule, the presumption against retroactivity, the canon of constitutional avoidance, and so on and so on), none of which is outcome determinative but all of which have a regular place in the
Court‘s interpretive toolkit.19 There are established interpretive frameworks like Chevron, the two-step test for judging the
permissibility of an agency‘s interpretation of gaps or ambiguities in a statute it administers.20
The goal for the advocates of methodological stare decisis is
to strengthen these regularities and expand their domain to
cover more of the remaining points of disagreement, generating
something like a binding law of interpretation. And although
their admonitions are aimed mostly at the Supreme Court, they
want methodological stare decisis to operate vertically as well—
that is, such that the lower courts must adhere to the binding
regime the Supreme Court adopts.21 It could hardly be other18. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353–54 (1990).
19. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 6 (listing many such canons and presumptions).
20. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
45 (1984); see Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 986 (2005) (―Chevron established a familiar two-step procedure for
evaluating whether an agency‘s interpretation of a statute is lawful.‖).
21. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 3, at 1869, 1884. The assumption among
the proponents of methodological stare decisis—and probably the prevailing
assumption more broadly, to the extent there is one—is that the Supreme
Court has the legal authority, if it can overcome its own divisions and chooses
to exercise that authority, to direct the inferior federal courts on matters of
interpretive methodology. Lower courts tend not to give the question much
thought, but they seem to agree that the Supreme Court has this power, or at
least they do not openly protest it. See, e.g., Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg.
L.L.C., 781 F.3d 1178, 1179–80, 1182–84 (9th Cir. 2015) (treating Supreme
Court cases as abrogating circuit precedent that had required a canon of narrow construction of removal-jurisdiction statutes); Elgharib v. Napolitano, 600
F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that the court ―employ[s] a three-step
legislative-interpretation framework established by the Supreme Court‖);
United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 940 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (―[I]f an ambiguity lurks in the statute‘s wording, or if the statute‘s wording leads to irrational results, we are instructed by the Supreme
Court to consult additional interpretive tools, including the statute‘s title, its
history and purpose, and canons of construction, in an attempt to ascertain
and give effect to Congress‘s meaning.‖); Andrews v. United States, 441 F.3d
220, 223 (4th Cir. 2006) (observing that the Supreme Court had not interpreted the provision at issue but that ―the Court did establish an important interpretative method‖ for approaching the provision); PPG Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (―The Supreme Court has instructed that the courts must defer to an agency‘s interpretation of the statute
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wise, for the supposed benefits of stare decisis—predictability,
restraint, and so on—would fail to materialize if the courts
handling most of the cases did not join the program.
There are plenty of questions one might raise about the desirability and feasibility of methodological stare decisis,22 but
surely one interesting and important question regarding the
vertical operation of binding methodological precedent is how
lower courts behave today in the absence of a formalized, selfconsciously binding law of interpretation. To the extent the Suan agency has been charged with administering provided its interpretation is
a reasonable one.‖). The proposition that the Supreme Court has the authority
to supervise methodology has not gone unchallenged. See Amy Coney Barrett,
The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 387
(2006) (raising the question whether ―the Supreme Court ha[s] the authority
to prescribe, through adjudication, rules of statutory interpretation that all
federal courts must observe‖); Jennifer M. Bandy, Note, Interpretive Freedom:
A Necessary Component of Article III Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651 (2011) (arguing that binding interpretive frameworks conflict with the inherent authority
possessed by every federal judge). My focus in this Article is the lower federal
courts, but whether the Supreme Court could require state courts to follow a
particular method when interpreting federal law raises additional interesting
questions. The answer might depend on the puzzling matter of what interpretive methodology is: substance, procedure, or something else. See generally
Gluck, supra note 3 (discussing different conceptions of the legal status of interpretive methodology). Nonetheless, for purposes of this Article, we can assume that the prevailing attitude is correct and that the Supreme Court indeed has the legal authority to direct lower courts, or at least the lower federal
courts, on matters of interpretive method.
22. Some commentators have argued quite forcefully that it is not desirable for the courts to attempt to regularize and solidify their practices across
time and across different kinds of cases. E.g., Evan J. Criddle & Glen
Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1581–
95 (2014); Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 48 (2010). We can safely bracket
that dispute, as the aims here are more descriptive and explanatory than
normative. Similarly, we can set aside questions about the desirability of vertical uniformity, i.e., whether it makes sense for the lower courts to use exactly the same interpretive rules and methods as the Supreme Court. Several
scholars have considered whether the distinctive institutional roles and competencies of the lower federal courts and the state courts should lead them to
employ approaches to statutory interpretation that differ somewhat from the
U.S. Supreme Court‘s approaches. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl &
Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
1215 (2012) (exploring whether elected judges and appointed judges should
use different methods); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity:
How To Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012) (considering the relationship between a court‘s place in the judicial hierarchy and
interpretive methodology); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law
Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 (2013) (examining whether state courts with general common law powers should diverge from federal courts with respect to
interpretive method).
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preme Court has a comprehensible interpretive regime and
modifies it in perceptible ways, perhaps the lower courts already follow along as a matter of what one could call de facto
precedent. That is the question this Article investigates at
some length, but it is worth setting out the expectations that
intuition and existing knowledge might suggest.
There are several reasons to expect that the lower courts
would tend to follow the Supreme Court‘s methodological lead,
where there is a discernible lead, whether or not they are required to do so by a formal system of methodological stare decisis. To begin with, Supreme Court Justices and other judges
(especially other federal judges) are members of the same professional legal culture subject to similar internal norms. The
judges may regard themselves as members of the same team
engaged in the same joint effort, such that the lower courts‘
role is to emulate what the Supreme Court, their role model,
would do.23 Bolstering the effect of role orientations, the fear of
reversal might play a role in encouraging lower courts to heed
their superiors‘ preferences, though such fear probably plays a
smaller role with regard to interpretive methods than with regard to substantive policy outcomes. Moreover, even in the absence of any conscious attempt to follow the Supreme Court‘s
methodological trends, the lower courts might still move in
parallel to the extent that all courts are influenced by similar
external and contextual factors.
Further reasons to expect lower courts to follow the Supreme Court‘s methodological lead come into view if one considers some other features of our hierarchical judicial system.
Lower courts are as a general matter required to obey higher
courts, so one should expect compliance as the lower courts‘ default mode. True, one does see occasional outbursts of lowercourt defiance, but empirical testing has turned up little evidence of significant non-compliance with precedent, even in
controversial civil-liberties cases that one might expect to engender conflict.24 Sara C. Benesh and Malia Reddick, for exam23. Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained
Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605,
1612–13 (1995) (developing a ―team‖ model of the judiciary).
24. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron,
The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme CourtCircuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 690 (1994) (finding, in a
study of search-and-seizure cases, that the courts of appeals displayed a high
degree of congruence with Supreme Court outcomes and responsiveness to the
Court‘s changing preferences).
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ple, found that the courts of appeals usually acceded quite
quickly to Warren Court decisions overruling prior law, which
is an interesting result given that one might have expected the
Court‘s own mutability to diminish the alacrity of lower-court
compliance.25 Moreover, even in circumstances in which the
formal legal rule is that lower courts are not bound to follow
their superiors—namely, when the higher court spoke in dicta—lower courts tend to obey anyway.26
For all of the above reasons, one might suspect that formally imposing vertical precedent—making methodology into real
law that lower courts must obey—would not have great practical effect. That is, the real impediments to a more lawlike approach to interpretation throughout the hierarchy might not
involve the formalities of stare decisis but might rather stem
from the Court‘s own inconsistency and from the inherently
slippery, non-lawlike nature of many interpretive rules.
Still, we cannot just take lower-court adherence to the Supreme Court‘s methods for granted. Interpretive methodology
presents some unusual possibilities for doctrinal slippages and
deviations. As stated already, probably the leading gripe about
the Court‘s methodology is that it is too inconsistent and unclear: even the most faithful agent would lack reliable guidance
on many matters, and that faithful lower court might actually
be misled if it took all of the Court‘s vacillating pronouncements as binding. But even setting that important point aside,
it may be that the high-profile contexts in which political scientists have tended to search for non-compliance—and largely
failed to find it—are actually the worst places to look for it. Instead, as recent work by Matthew Tokson suggests, one might
do better to look for slippage with regard to lower-profile but
more frequently encountered matters, often involving litigation
procedure, because such matters involve ingrained judicial habits, may have significant effects on judicial workload, and can
be hard for higher courts to police.27 Although Tokson does not
include interpretive methodology among his several case stud25. Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J.
POL. 534, 541–47 (2002).
26. See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2025–26,
2032–42 (2013) (providing empirical evidence that the holding/dictum distinction rarely affects lower-court decision making).
27. See Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 901, 925–30 (2015).
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ies, it may actually provide a very good example of a field in
which lower-court non-compliance, especially of the inertial rather than defiant sort, is a real prospect. Because judges encounter interpretive problems routinely, they may develop their
own habitual approaches that can be slow to change. Even
when the Supreme Court does establish and modify genuine
rules, interpretation is complex and multi-factored enough that
compliance with those rules is hard to divine, both for reviewing courts and maybe even for the lower courts themselves. The
focus of most players in the system will, naturally, be on the
lower courts‘ outcomes rather than their reasoning. Moreover,
depending on the content of the Supreme Court‘s interpretive
guidance, following the Court‘s rules could entail substantial
additional work, which again provides a reason even for faithful agents to drag their feet.
In sum, although we have plenty of reason to expect that
lower courts will, in the main, act as good-faith implementers
of perceptible directions, we should not simply assume that the
Supreme Court‘s messages about the interpretive regime will
successfully propagate through the judicial system. Investigating the success of such inter-judicial communications, and the
factors that may aid or hinder that success, is the aim of the
rest of this Article.
C. A NOTE ON THE SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES AND THE
INFERENCES THEY SUPPORT
A note on this Article‘s methodology is appropriate before
proceeding further. The next several parts of the Article consider various instances of interpretive change. The examples
involve different kinds of canons (textual, substantive, and other) and different kinds of changes (including gradual shifts in
the prevalence of certain canons, sudden shifts in a canon‘s
meaning, and the arrival of new canons). I did not attempt to
catalogue and study the whole universe of prior and ongoing interpretive shifts, nor can one realistically claim to assemble a
―representative‖ sample when one is dealing with such a complex and multifarious thing. Given the exploratory nature of
this project, I have instead chosen a varied but admittedly noncomprehensive set of examples. No single episode or piece of evidence can answer every question, but examining a variety of
episodes using different methods can illustrate some important
features of interpretive change and reveal an interesting range
of lower-court reactions. One consideration in selecting exam-
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ples and choosing measurement techniques was how readily
and reliably a particular canon or episode could be studied. For
some canons, the Supreme Court‘s own erratic behavior or features of the canon itself make it hard to know what one should
expect even perfect lower courts to do. Regarding measurement
techniques, studying changes in citation rates of various canons (which I do in some cases) or changes in courts‘ statements
about the meaning or validity of canons (which I do in other
cases) are more tractable forms of investigation than attempting to directly determine whether a canon has gained or lost
outcome-affecting force.
A note on the tenability of causal conclusions is in order as
well. It is valuable to know how the interpretive practices of
different courts compare, but it is more valuable still if one can
determine whether and how cross-court influence occurs. If the
interpretive practices of the Supreme Court and lower courts
tend to move in parallel, that could show the existence of influence (presumably in the top-down direction). Alternatively,
parallel conduct could merely reflect the simultaneous but independent effect of external forces (attorney behavior, evolving
legal culture, etc.). In some of the instances that follow, the circumstances make it easy to detect the Supreme Court‘s influence on lower courts. In other instances, it will be hard to rule
out external factors as predominant causes. In still others, one
observes divergences between different courts‘ interpretive
practices, which shows at least some weakness in some part of
the mechanism by which change is transmitted through the
system. By comparing and contrasting the lower courts‘ responses to various instances of interpretive change, one can
tentatively identify factors that might have generalizable effects.
II. LARGE-SCALE TRENDS
The interpretive regime of the Supreme Court has not been
static over time. Interpretive approaches wax and wane; particular rules rise and recede.28 According to some accounts, a
28. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90
B.U. L. REV. 109, 127 & n.84 (2010) (citing examples of substantive canons
that evolved over time); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1989–90 (2005) (observing that ―the particulars of
even longstanding canons drift over time‖ and that ―the Court occasionally
creates new canons‖); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 181–87 (2001) (providing examples of cyclical changes
in interpretive methodology). See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN
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key shift in interpretive mindset occurred early in the Nation‘s
history, as courts turned away from an older tradition of equitable interpretation in favor of an approach that emphasized
the judiciary‘s duty to serve as the legislature‘s ―faithful
agent.‖29 Moving forward to more recent times, the twentieth
century saw the Supreme Court‘s reliance on legislative history
increase at first and then drop off toward the end.30 Other
changes are quicker and more discrete than those gradual
shifts. In the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the Court
created or seriously strengthened several federalism and stateimmunity canons.31 And for a very recent example, which
shows that the interpretive toolkit continues to evolve, just a
few years ago the Court altered the standards governing judicial deference to Treasury regulations.32
The existence of shifts in interpretive methods leads to a
variety of important questions, such as whether the lower
courts‘ interpretive practices tend to move in parallel with the
Supreme Court‘s practices, whether any such parallel behaviors are causally related, and how any such causal mechanism
COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999)
(providing a sweeping history of American statutory interpretation from its
English roots to the present age).
29. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 78–105 (2001) (tracing the decline of the interpretive doctrine of the ―equity of the statute‖ in the early Republic).
30. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and
Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 222 (2006) (noting significant decline in
the Supreme Court‘s use of legislative history from the Burger to the
Rehnquist Courts); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance
on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 369, 384–86 (1999) (documenting trends in citations to legislative history from 1980 to 1998); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology:
The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1653, 1715–16, 1725 (2010) (documenting decline in the Supreme Court‘s citations to legislative history in recent decades); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan
and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the
Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266 (2013) (tracing and
explaining the normalization of the use of legislative history on the Supreme
Court in the mid-twentieth century); Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes:
Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1942–46 (2005) (tracking use
of legislative history in tax cases over most of the twentieth century).
31. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593, 619–29 (1992); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 477–78 (1991)
(White, J., concurring) (complaining about the majority‘s creation of a federalism ―plain statement‖ rule).
32. See infra Part III.
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operates. This Part investigates correspondences at the level of
large-scale, gradual trends. The following Parts then consider
the lower courts‘ responses to more discrete, quicker methodological changes.
Regarding the large-scale trends, the existing research
suggests that the lower courts‘ patterns of behavior do reflect—
in a loose way—patterns in the Supreme Court. To date, the
most comprehensive examination of macro-level trends in lower-court methodology is that performed by Frank Cross. He
showed, using concededly imperfect measures, that in the early
1990s the federal courts of appeals started referring to legislative history much less and textualist principles and linguistic
canons much more.33 That shift in the lower courts roughly corresponds to trends in the Supreme Court, where reliance on
textual and substantive canons was increasing and legislative
history was in relative retreat.34 In addition, recent work on
federal courts‘ citations of dictionaries finds that the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals have both increased their use
of dictionaries in recent decades, though the increase in the
Supreme Court has been much larger and sharper.35
In this portion of the Article, I present some new evidence
that bolsters and extends the prior research. One could study
any number of interpretive tools, but for present purposes I
have chosen to track courts‘ use, over four decades, of several
prominent linguistic canons of word association and grammar.
An example is ejusdem generis, the maxim providing that a
general phrase at the end of a list is limited to instances of the
same type as those specifically mentioned, such that ―other vehicles‖ in a statutory provision referring to ―cars, trucks, and
other vehicles‖ would more likely include motorcycles than
33. CROSS, supra note 4, at 183–91. Cross‘s method involved running
Westlaw searches for terms like ―legislative history‖ and ―ejusdem generis‖
and tallying West Key Number codes related to interpretive principles like the
―whole act‖ rule. Id.
34. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and
the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29–36 (2005)
(tracing the Supreme Court‘s use of canons in labor and employment cases
from 1969–2002); supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the declining role of legislative history in the Supreme Court).
35. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Dictionaries 2.0: Exploring the
Gap Between the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 125 Y ALE L.J.
F. 104, 105, 108–09 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/dictionaries
-2.0-exploring-the-gap-between-the-supreme-court-and-courts-of-appeals; John
Calhoun, Note, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court
and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484, 502 (2014).

BRUHL_5fmt

2015]

1/3/2016 1:04 PM

COMMUNICATING THE CANONS

497

trains or bicycles.36 When one wants to study a large number of
cases over a long period, the task is significantly simpler when
one can rely on electronic word searches rather than individually reading many potential target cases. Many linguistic canons are good subjects for study in this regard because there is a
relatively close association between the interpretive rule and
the name for it. As a result, one can run searches that avoid
both too many false positives and too many false negatives.
The figures below show citations of four well-established
linguistic canons—namely, ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis,
expressio unius, and the rule of the last antecedent (together
with a few variant spellings and phrasings)—as applied to
questions of statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court and
the federal courts of appeals for the forty-year period 1975
through 2014.37 My strategy resembles that used by Cross, but
I employ a somewhat improved (though still imperfect) approach.38 I also add almost a decade of new data for the courts
36. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
74 (2007).
37. The primary search, run in WestlawNext‘s Supreme Court and federal
courts of appeals databases, was:
adv: OP((expressio or expresio or inclusio or ―last antecedent‖ or
―noscitur a sociis‖ or ―ejusdem generis‖) /p (statut! or act or legislat!
or congress! or ―U.S.C.‖)).
The ―adv‖ prefix indicates that one is conducting a ―terms and connectors‖
search as one would do in the old Westlaw system, as opposed to using the
fuzzier search algorithms employed by default in the new WestlawNext system. The ―OP‖ field restriction limits the search to the court-created opinions,
excluding material in West‘s Key Number topic descriptions and headnotes
(which I worried would introduce more error and cross-period variation). The
restriction at the end of the search was meant to limit the results to uses of
the canons in statutory interpretation as opposed to other contexts such as
contract interpretation. There are in fact quite a number of canon-citing contract cases, especially insurance cases, and so I believe that using this limitation makes for a better search overall, even though it falsely excludes some
statutory cases. Similarly, because my search terms focus on the names of the
canons rather than trying to find other language that captures the idea behind
them, the raw numbers reported by the search understate the true number of
canon invocations. Although my search is accordingly imperfect, the imprecisions should not distort the patterns over time. Note that the results were limited to published opinions, for the reasons discussed below. See infra notes 43–
47 and accompanying text. In addition to the combined search, I also ran
searches for each canon individually. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
38. My approach differs from Cross‘s in several ways: First, I include a
measure that attempts to roughly capture rates of citation as well as raw
counts. Second, my search terms exclude material supplied by West, such as
headnotes, and limit the results to cases using the canons in the statutory interpretation context (versus other contexts such as the interpretation of insurance contracts, wills, etc.). See supra note 37. Third, I include only published
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of appeals (his data ended with 2005), and I add some more directly comparable data on the Supreme Court‘s use of the canons. (The federal district courts are not included in this analysis because they are difficult to study in a systematic way
through electronic databases.39)
Every research strategy has strengths and weaknesses.
One potential limitation of my approach is that it tracks canon
citations without attempting to determine the citations‘ importance to ultimate case outcomes. In particular, my results
do not distinguish between citations that follow the result a
linguistic canon suggests and those that acknowledge a canon
but then do not follow it. The justification for this approach is
that citations of a canon are independently meaningful; they
reflect the canon‘s prominence in the interpretive culture of the
day. Further, whatever weaknesses this approach might have
in other contexts, it is especially appropriate for study of the
linguistic canons. A decision that cites a linguistic canon but
finds it outweighed by other considerations is not really a ―negative‖ citation. One could not necessarily say the same thing
about all other interpretive canons and sources. Regarding discussions of inferences from legislative inaction, for example,
one might expect more references to be genuinely negative in
the sense that they question the appropriateness of inferring
meaning from silence.40 This provides another reason the linguistic canons are good test subjects for large-scale study.
Figure 1 presents data for the courts of appeals. The lighter-shaded data series shows the number of cases that cite one
or more of the selected linguistic canons, and the darkershaded data series reflects an adjusted citation rate calculated
as described below. For each data series, the jagged line reflects
each year‘s observation and the smoother curve represents a
trendline that evens out some of the fluctuations in the annual
data so as to aid visualization.41
opinions. (One can do this by using the ―reported‖ checkbox on the
WestlawNext results screen.) Although Cross‘s book is not explicit on this
point, I believe he includes unpublished cases. (The figures are usually similar
whether or not one includes unpublished opinions, as the large majority of
these canon-citing cases are published.) Fourth, I have added the ―rule of the
last antecedent‖ to the three linguistic canons Cross used.
39. See Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District
Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 982–87 (2008) (explaining that much of the work
of the district courts is missing from Lexis and Westlaw).
40. E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2426–27 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
41. The smoothed trendlines in the figures were generated using a LO-
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Figure 1: Use of Linguistic Canons in the Courts of Appeals, Published Cases 1975–2014

Caseloads and docket compositions are not constant over
time, which raises the possibility that the increase in the number of canon citations merely reflects the increased opportunities for canon citation that come along with larger dockets. I
have taken that possibility into account and have corrected for
it in two ways. First, to try to contain the role of docket growth,
as well as to guard against serious cross-temporal and crosscourt discrepancies in how many unpublished decisions made
their way into West‘s electronic databases over the study period,43 the results shown above reflect only published opinions.
(As it happens, the large majority of the cases using the canons
to interpret statutes are published,44 which is not especially
ESS (local regression) plug-in for Excel, with the smoothing parameter α set to
0.33.
43. Different circuits began making the full text of their unpublished
opinions available to electronic databases at different times. See Andrew T.
Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical
Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 205–15 (2007). Therefore, even setting aside the increase in the number of actual unpublished decisions issued by the courts of appeals, the number available on Westlaw increases during the period under study as more courts made their unpublished
decisions available.
44. Even in recent years, in which there are many unpublished opinions
and the bulk of them can be found on Westlaw, around 90% of the cases citing
the linguistic canons at issue here are published.
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surprising if one considers that unpublished decisions are
mostly intended for cases that are clearly controlled by binding
precedent.45) Unpublished opinions sharply increased in number during the study period as a response to rising appellate
caseloads.46 But published opinions, which are always easily
searchable, were somewhat steadier in number over the relevant time horizon. In fact, the period of increasing canon use
beginning in the late 1980s and continuing to the present actually corresponds to a period of declining numbers of published
opinions.47
Second, as a precaution against changes in docket composition over time, I calculated an ―adjusted rate‖ of canon citation,
illustrated by the darker lines in Figure 1, which attempts to
measure the cases citing the relevant linguistic canons as a
proportion of the cases that meaningfully engage with matters
of statutory interpretation.48 That denominator increased sub45. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001) (―Cases
decided by nonprecedential disposition generally involve facts that are materially indistinguishable from those of prior published opinions.‖).
46. See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 221 (1999) (explaining that the growth of nonpublication can be explained in ―one word, the same word that describes the most serious problem facing all our courts today: volume‖). Today, the traditional
terminology of ―unpublished‖ versus ―published‖ decisions is somewhat inapt,
as even many ―unpublished‖ (i.e., designated by the court as non-precedential)
decisions of the federal courts of appeals are now printed in an actual book,
West‘s Federal Appendix.
47. Here are annual figures on published opinions in the federal courts of
appeals, at four-year intervals, with the numbers of opinions rounded to the
nearest hundred:
1989: 6800 2005: 5400
1993: 6700 2009: 5000
1997: 6100 2013: 4100
2001: 5500
The sources for these figures are Table S-3 (or S-5, for 1989) in the annual Judicial Business reports published by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts. 1993 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 176 tbl.S-3; 1989
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 109 tbl.S-5; Judicial Business
of the United States Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts (click
on the ―Judicial Business‖ link for the appropriate year; then scroll down to
―Table S-3‖ and click ―Download‖ for years 1997–2009 data; click on the ―Judicial Business 2013‖ link; then click on ―Judicial Business 2013 Tables‖ on the
right; then scroll down to ―Table S-3‖ and click ―Download‖ for 2013 data) (last
visited Nov. 1, 2015). Note that the reporting years for the Administrative Office do not correspond to calendar years. For example, the 2013 data reflect
the twelve-month period that ended September 30, 2013.
48. There is no very good way to determine how many cases decided by
the courts of appeals involve statutory interpretation. There are official gov-
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stantially during the first decade of the dataset, which initially
decreased the citation rate, but the denominator held fairly
steady after that, which explains why the citations counts and
the citation rate move together quite closely beginning in the
late 1980s. The behavior of the adjusted rate suggests that the
late-80s increase in citations was not driven primarily by increased opportunities for courts to engage in statutory interpretation.
The data reflected in Figure 1 support several observations. Most importantly, and consistent with Cross‘s findings,
one sees the linguistic canons becoming more prevalent in the
courts of appeals in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The courts
of appeals cited the linguistic canons in greater raw numbers,
and a larger proportion of their cases involving statutory interpretation cited the linguistic canons. Further reason to be confident that the data reveal actual changes in interpretive practices—as opposed to reflecting mere docket effects—comes from
Cross‘s finding, mentioned above,49 that the courts of appeals
began citing legislative history less at about the same time
they started using the linguistic canons more. Finally, I note
that although Figure 1 shows the results of a combined search
for all four of the targeted canons, I also collected data on each
separately. Some canons varied more than others, and the
smaller numbers that result from disaggregating the canons
make it harder to separate trends from noise, but the overall
results are not attributable to any particular outlier canon.50
ernment statistics that track appeals by type (e.g., diversity cases, employment discrimination, criminal sentencing, and so forth), but the fact that a
case is based on a statutory claim does not mean that the case involves statutory interpretation in any serious way (as opposed to involving the sufficiency
of the evidence, the application of settled law to particular facts, the exercise
of judicial sentencing discretion, and the like). My approach here, which admittedly generates only a rough measure, was to use a WestlawNext word
search that was designed to find cases that deal with statutory interpretation
per se. The precise terms were: adv: OP((statut! or legislat! or ―act of congress‖) /s (interpret! or constru!)). The OP restrictor (i.e., ―opinion‖) excludes
the portions of the decisions supplied by West, such as topic key numbers and
headnotes; I worried that West‘s practices might be inconsistent over time.
The above search provided a denominator by which one could divide the annual raw citation counts to generate a proportion. Needless to say, different denominators would generate different proportions, so it would be inappropriate
to make a strong claim about the absolute level of canon usage (e.g., ―Four
percent of the statutory interpretation cases in the courts of appeals cite one of
these four linguistic canons.‖). But the point is to provide a measure that can
roughly adjust for shifting dockets over time, which this should do.
49. See supra text accompanying note 33 (discussing Cross‘s findings).
50. The behavior of the lowest-frequency member of this set of canons, the

BRUHL_5fmt

502

1/3/2016 1:04 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:481

What caused the shift in the courts of appeals‘ citation patterns? One appealing hypothesis is that the lower courts were
following the Supreme Court‘s lead. It may be impossible to answer the causal question with certainty, but we can at least
begin the discussion by examining the patterns in the Supreme
Court to see how they compare. Figure 2, accordingly, provides
data on citations of the selected linguistic canons by the Supreme Court.
Figure 2: Use of Linguistic Canons in the Supreme
Court, 1975–2014

Although the small numbers involved can generate severe
swings from year to year, Figure 2 nonetheless shows that the
Supreme Court started citing the linguistic canons more often
in the late 1980s. The Court‘s merits docket was famously
shrinking over much of the period being studied—there was a
drop of roughly 50% from the beginning of the period to the
end51—which makes it important to adjust for the contracting
docket, or, better still, to adjust for the number of statutory
cases per year. The darker data series in Figure 2 makes such
an adjustment; for the sake of consistency, the approach to calrule of the last antecedent, is considered in greater detail below. See infra Part
V.B.
51. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 89–90
(5th ed. 2012).
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culating the adjusted rate is the same one used in Figure 1.
The rate of canon citation has increased more sharply than
have the raw numbers. It is not clear to me whether the more
important measure, in terms of how the lower courts perceive
the Supreme Court’s practices, is the raw number of citations or
the rate of citations. My sense is that frequency of canon use in
either sense is quite hard for lower courts to pick up on, a point
to which I return later.52
If one compares Figures 1 and 2 above, one sees a rough
correspondence in trends. In particular, both courts started citing the linguistic canons more around the late 1980s or early
1990s. (Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court, notably, in
September 1986.) Perhaps another upswing in use of linguistic
canons is underway today, though it is hard to say without another few years of data.
What explains this correspondence? Whether the lower
courts were influenced by the Supreme Court‘s actual or perceived interpretive practices is hard to determine with certainty, but the timing of the lower courts‘ shift naturally suggests
that possibility. Further reason to suspect influence comes from
the fact that the correlation between the two data series increases if one offsets them by a few years, such that the lowercourt data is matched with Supreme Court data from a few
years before. The lower courts often say that they regard the
Supreme Court as their model on matters of interpretive method,53 and one would expect the lower courts to notice if the Supreme Court became more textualist generally and canoninclined in particular. If the Supreme Court‘s methodology
shifted in a textualist direction regarding use of legislative history, dictionaries, and other sources besides just the canons,
the combined effect could be more apparent to lower courts
than would a single aspect alone.
A related possibility is that the lower courts were influenced, but not by changes in the actual practices of the Supreme Court—which might be rather difficult to discern with
much precision—so much as by broader developments in the
law, legal culture, and institutional context. These influences
would include the aggressive public campaign against legislative intent waged by Justice Scalia and his textualist comrades54 and, more generally, the late-twentieth-century burst of
52. See infra Parts V, VII.A.
53. See supra note 21.
54. See Marty Lederman, Textualism? Purposivism? The Chief Justice
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conservative legal theorizing about interpretive matters in the
judiciary, the academy, and the executive branch.55
A few other potential explanations for the lower courts‘
shifting citation patterns should be mentioned, though they do
not fit the data as well. One such hypothesis is that the methodological shift in the lower courts was the result of the changing ideological composition of the lower courts, with Republican
appointees being more inclined toward textualism. But that
explanation does not fit the pattern well, as the periods of increasingly Republican courts of appeals do not match the periods of increasing textualism.56
Another initially appealing hypothesis is that the shift toward textual canons is attributable to the Chevron doctrine,
which was also gathering strength in the lower courts at
around the same time as the observed increase in use of textual
canons.57 According to one understanding of the Chevron doctrine, the doctrine‘s first step privileges textual analysis over
other modes of inquiry,58 which could lead courts reviewing
agency action to use textual canons more. Without denying that
Chevron could play some role, it does not provide a complete
explanation. For one thing, the pattern in the data persists
even if one excludes from the count any case that cites Chevron.
Further, the text-only approach to Chevron‘s first step—which
still has not clearly won out today—does not describe a settled
approach to Chevron that prevailed twenty-five years ago,
Comes down on the Side of Interpretive Pragmatism, SLATE (June 25, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/
2015/scotus_roundup/supreme_court_2015_john_roberts_ruling_in_king_v_
burwell.html (discussing how the textualist campaign led by Justice Scalia
has had a ―profound‖ effect on how litigants present their cases and may have
meaningfully influenced lower courts). That public campaign continues, most
recently in the form of the Scalia/Garner treatise. See ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
(2012).
55. Recall, for instance, that the Department of Justice produced an influential report criticizing legislative history in the late 1980s. See OFFICE OF
LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION i, v (1989).
56. See CROSS, supra note 4, at 185–86.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 176–186 (discussing the rise of the
Chevron doctrine).
58. See Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL
AGENCIES 55, 57–58, 63–71 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (contrasting traditional and textualist approaches to step one).
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which is when the increase in canon use occurred.59 Put differently, methodology in Chevron cases is an important front in
the broader textualist campaign,60 but Chevron probably did
not cause the uptick in use of textual canons.
When dealing with a long-term, broad-based shift in interpretive predispositions such as the one described above, one
has to acknowledge that the causal relationships can be complex and uncertain. Some of the episodes of interpretive change
discussed later in the Article will be simpler and will allow for
firmer causal inferences.
A final note about the correspondences observed above:
The fact that large-scale interpretive trends in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts tend to move together over time
does not necessarily mean that decision making in statutory
cases at different levels of the judicial hierarchy looks the same
in some absolute sense. (To analogize, the moods of a boss and
an employee might move up or down in parallel and yet one
could be much happier in absolute terms than the other.) On
the contrary, the figures above reveal at least one important
difference in interpretive approaches across courts. The number of published opinions issued by the courts of appeals every
year is around fifty to seventy-five times larger than the number of decisions issued by the Supreme Court.61 If both levels of
the judiciary used the linguistic canons at about the same rate,
then one would find roughly fifty to seventy-five more canon
invocations in the courts of appeals than in the Supreme Court.
But instead, as one can see from the figures above, the number
of canon invocations in published opinions of the courts of appeals in any given year is, very roughly, only about ten times
greater than the corresponding number in the Supreme Court.
That means that the rate of canon use in Supreme Court opinions is substantially higher than the rate in the courts of appeals. (And this comparison ignores the large number of unpublished decisions, which use the canons relatively rarely.62
Including them would widen the disparity in rates of use.)

59. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 11, at 823–24 (describing
continuing disagreement in the Supreme Court and lower courts over the role
of legislative history in Chevron analysis).
60. See Garrett, supra note 58, at 64–65 (discussing how textualism has
influenced the Chevron doctrine).
61. See supra notes 47, 51 (providing docket figures for the Supreme
Court and courts of appeals).
62. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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The disparity remains, though its magnitude shrinks, if
one adjusts for differences in docket composition. A sizable
fraction of Supreme Court cases involve debatable questions of
statutory interpretation, but the courts of appeals confront
many cases without much of a statutory-interpretive component: cases in which criminal defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and the reasonableness of their sentences, cases concerning whether particular facts satisfy wellestablished doctrinal tests, diversity cases involving state
common law, and so on. Recall that the darker lines in Figures
1 and 2 above represent an adjusted rate of canon citations
measured as a proportion of cases discussing statutory interpretation.63 Citation rates have increased in both the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals since the mid-1980s, but while
the rate in the courts of appeals roughly doubled since then,
the rate in the Supreme Court increased more sharply.64 The
adjusted rate of citation in the Supreme Court is now around
twice as high as the rate in the courts of appeals. (It is hard to
quantify the difference very precisely given the swings in the
Supreme Court data.)
This cross-court disparity in rates of canon use is not especially surprising. Even if one considers just the subset of cases
presenting questions of statutory interpretation, citation rates
for many or even most canons should bump up against a sort of
ceiling in the lower courts. One important reason is that another source of guidance, namely precedent, looms much larger as
one moves down the appellate system. If a case is controlled by
Supreme Court or circuit precedent, directly or by analogy,
then there is little room for independent interpretation in the
lower courts. Further, a higher proportion of lower-court cases
are relatively easy in the sense that a plain textual analysis
yields a sensible result that requires no further inquiry. The
canons, legislative history, and other interpretive tools are
more relevant when a court is addressing a close question on
essentially a blank slate, which is characteristic of many Supreme Court cases but few cases in lower courts.

63. See supra note 48.
64. Calhoun‘s recent study of dictionary citations reveals a roughly similar pattern: the Supreme Court‘s citations of dictionaries rose sharply and
substantially after the mid-80s, but the increase in the lower courts was more
subtle; as a result, the Supreme Court‘s rate of dictionary usage is now much
higher than the courts of appeals‘ rate. Calhoun, supra note 35, at 492, 502,
507.
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Another factor that may contribute to disparities in citation rates is that Supreme Court opinions tend to differ in writing style from opinions in the courts of appeals, even the published subset of the latter. As befits a court with plenty of
resources and a shrinking, self-selected docket, the Supreme
Court‘s decisions are long and exhaustive and frequently feature dueling opinions that must respond to each other,65 all of
which multiplies the arguments and canons mentioned. If a
canon can be used, it probably will be. All of that is less true in
the lower courts.
III. QUICK CANONS
Tracing broad-based, gradual changes such as the textualism shift discussed above is valuable, but it certainly does not
tell us everything we would want to know about how the lower
courts respond to changes in the interpretive regime. Shifts
like those discussed above involve complicated causal explanations, and large-scale correspondences can mask particular
cases of divergence. Therefore, it may be more interesting and
informative, and one might find some more surprises, if one
engages in a more fine-grained analysis of particular changes
in the Supreme Court‘s interpretive regime. Interpretive
change does not happen only gradually and in broad terms;
some changes can be quick or specific or both, as when the Supreme Court creates a new canon or modifies or abrogates an
old one. Such events allow us to observe how the lower courts
respond, if they respond at all, and they might help us understand why some changes are more readily communicated
through the judicial system than others.
Beginning in this Part of the Article and continuing in the
next several Parts, I describe a number of discrete examples of
interpretive change. I begin in this Part with an example of a
shift that the lower courts rapidly assimilated, and then the following parts turn to instances in which the lower courts have
either lagged behind the Supreme Court, jumped out ahead of
it, or otherwise failed to closely follow its moves.
The lower courts have the capacity to respond to a change
in the interpretive regime with extreme speed. Occasions to do
65. See Bruhl, supra note 22, at 477–79, 484–85 (discussing the style of
Supreme Court opinions); see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2549248 (discussing the phenomenon of dueling invocations of
canons).
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so are fairly infrequent, as it is not every day that the Supreme
Court makes clear, sharp, and definitive breaks in matters of
methodology. But an excellent occasion to observe lower-court
responsiveness came just a few years ago, when the Supreme
Court changed the deference regime governing the Treasury‘s
interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code. Lower courts
grasped the significance of the change almost immediately.
To begin with a bit of background: When a court considers
an agency‘s interpretation of a statute the agency administers,
the court generally affords the agency‘s view a degree of deference in the sense that the court will acquiesce in a reasonable
agency interpretation even if the court, exercising its own independent judgment, would have chosen a different interpretation. Easily the most famous general-purpose deference regime
is Chevron, with Skidmore playing the role of backup when
Chevron is found inapplicable.66 But there are other deference
regimes too, some of which apply to specific fields of law, such
as national security or labor relations.67 The field of federal tax
law has its own subject-specific deference regime, ―National
Muffler deference.‖68 Or, rather, it used to have one: the Supreme Court‘s 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation for Educational and Medical Research v. Unites States abrogated National Muffler and brought tax law into the Chevron fold.69 ―We
see no reason,‖ Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court, ―why
our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency
expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review
of other regulations.‖70 The somewhat less deferential National
Muffler regime was repudiated, as were some other older tax
66. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (explaining when Chevron applies and when
Skidmore applies).
67. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098–100 (2008) (listing various deference regimes).
68. Nat‘l Muffler Dealers Ass‘n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
69. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
52–57 (2011). Some lower courts had already anticipated this move, see, e.g.,
Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm‘r, 515 F.3d 162, 167–71 (3d Cir. 2008), and
the Supreme Court itself had been inconsistent on which deference regime it
cited, see 562 U.S. at 53–54, so Mayo Foundation was not a total rupture with
the past. But it brought clarity and certainty, and it did abrogate the law of a
significant number of lower courts, namely those that had not already embraced Chevron. See infra note 72.
70. Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 56.
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cases that did not accord with the current understanding of the
Chevron doctrine.71
The lower judiciary responded swiftly. Mayo Foundation
was decided on January 11, 2011. Within weeks, one finds lower courts recognizing that the new decision had changed the
applicable deference regime.72 That is quite impressive, considering the lag time between briefing, oral argument (when there
is oral argument), and decision. Of course, finding cases that
quickly recognize the shift tells us only one side of the story.
Were there other courts that failed to catch on? To try to find
out, I searched for post-Mayo Foundation lower-court cases
that met three criteria: (1) they cited National Muffler or the
other cases abrogated by Mayo Foundation; (2) for the standard
of review; but (3) without citing Mayo Foundation.73 I found only one such case, though it is hardly clear that the proposition
for which it cited National Muffler was actually incorrect in the
wake of Mayo Foundation.74 In short, the lower courts almost
71. See id. at 56–68.
72. For early cases expressly noting that Mayo Foundation provided the
governing standard of review, see, for example, Home Concrete & Supply,
L.L.C. v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2011) (decided Feb. 7,
2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012); Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011) (decided Feb. 9, 2011); Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(decided Mar. 11, 2011), vacated mem., 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012). It appears that
all of the lower courts just cited had previously been in the National Muffler
camp, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of
Respondent at 19, Mayo Found., 562 U.S. 44 (No. 09–837), 2010 WL 3934618,
so this is not just a case of them continuing to do what they had done before
Mayo Foundation.
73. The other abrogated cases, besides National Muffler, were Rowan Cos.
v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981), and United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982), both of which stated that Treasury Regulations
received less deference when they were issued pursuant to the Treasury Department‘s general authority to issue rules instead of pursuant to a specific
authorization to implement a statutory provision. For each of these three repudiated cases, I used the Westlaw KeyCite feature to examine every postMayo Foundation citation in order to determine whether the citations involved
the standard of deference due Treasury Regulations and, if so, whether the
citing case also cited Mayo Foundation. Most of the recent citations to these
cases involve other holdings that Mayo Foundation did not address.
74. The case was Schwab v. Commissioner, 715 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2013),
in which the Ninth Circuit indirectly cited National Muffler through a citation
to a pre-Mayo Foundation Ninth Circuit case that itself cited National Muffler. Here is the language at issue: ―[A]s a general matter, ‗we defer to the
Treasury‘s interpretation of the statute‘ if the applicable regulations prove
dispositive. See Pac. First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Comm‘r, 961 F.2d 800, 805 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citing Nat‘l Muffler Dealers Ass‘n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
488 (1979)).‖ 715 F.3d at 1175 (parallel citations omitted). The proposition for
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immediately recognized that the deference landscape had
changed, and they modified their conduct accordingly. To be
clear, I do not claim the lower courts have always applied the
new decision correctly in all respects—recognizing that Chevron
applies is only part of the battle—but at a minimum they have
realized that they are supposed to be doing something different.
Several features of Mayo Foundation probably contributed
to its quick uptake, and it is useful to list them so as to facilitate comparisons with other episodes of canonical change.
First, the Supreme Court‘s opinion was clear and self-conscious
about making a change in the governing deference regime.75
The Court knew that it was making such a change, and the decision was written so as to make that intent abundantly clear
to anyone who read it. The old precedents were not ignored or
overruled only sub silentio; no tea-leaf reading or piecing together of footnotes was required. The opinion presents itself as
a directive.
Second, the content of the new directive was easy to articulate: Chevron now applies in the tax context; National Muffler
and the other old cases are out. (Again, that does not necessarily mean that applying Chevron will be easy or that Mayo will
generate a substantial shift in outcomes.) One could contrast
the clarity of this shift with another pronouncement about deference that was not nearly so easy to articulate, namely the
test announced in United States v. Mead Corp.76 Mead stated
that Chevron applies when ―Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and . . . the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.‖77 The Mead
standard is ordinarily satisfied when the agency has engaged
in notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication but
which National Muffler is cited is a bit puzzling, because it seems empty, but
it is hard to see how it is inconsistent with Mayo Foundation. Moreover, the
dispute in the Schwab case concerned the IRS‘s interpretation of its own regulation rather than the validity of the regulation as an interpretation of the
statute. See id. at 1176 & n.11.
75. See Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 53, 55, 57 (―[T]he parties disagree over
the proper framework for evaluating an ambiguous provision of the Internal
Revenue Code. . . . The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply
with full force in the tax context. . . . We believe Chevron and Mead, rather
than National Muffler and Rowan, provide the appropriate framework for
evaluating the [regulation].‖).
76. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
77. Id. at 226–27.
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not when it has used less formal modes of action, and yet the
use of any particular format is neither strictly necessary nor
sufficient.78 The lower courts rather famously struggled to understand how Mead modified Chevron‘s deference regime and,
soon after, what to make of Barnhart v. Walton.79 Different circuits took somewhat different approaches, and some of them
tried to fudge the issue by saying the result is the same under
whatever standard.80 The lower courts can hardly be blamed
when the Supreme Court announces complicated standards
and then offers somewhat inconsistent guidance from case to
case.81
In addition to the clarity of the Court‘s opinion and the
ease of understanding the content of the new rule, a third factor that also likely aided the dissemination of the new rule involves the nature of the canon involved. The various deference
doctrines—whether Chevron, National Muffler, or something
else—are artificial constructs that the Supreme Court creates
and tinkers with regularly. They were different in the past, and
they will probably change again in the future. Lower courts, attorneys, and others are therefore receptive to the possibility of
change. (This point about the nature of the deference doctrines
should become clearer later, when we contrast them with other
canons that are not so artificial and mutable.)
A fourth factor that likely contributed to the success of
Mayo Foundation‘s interpretive regime change is that it involved a rule applicable to a specific topic area, namely the specialized field of federal income tax, rather than a general interpretive principle applicable everywhere. Some insight on the
role of topic specificity can be found by considering the phenomenon of ―agency-specific precedents‖ described by Richard
I. Levy and Robert L. Glicksman.82 Much of administrative law,
such as the procedural requirements for notice-and-comment
78. See id. at 229–31; Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
79. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). See generally Lisa Schultz
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005) (discussing confusion over the Court‘s shifting pronouncements).
80. Bressman, supra note 79, at 1457–69.
81. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 347, 347 (2003) (suggesting that the D.C. Circuit‘s incoherent jurisprudence in this area is ―traceable to the flaws, fallacies, and confusions of the
Mead decision itself‖).
82. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents,
89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011).
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rulemaking or the ―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard of review, is supposed to be universal default law that applies the
same regardless of which agency is involved. But, as Levy and
Glicksman point out, a court deciding an administrative case
concerning some particular agency often draws its descriptions
of the relevant universal principles from prior cases involving
the same agency. For example, cases involving the FCC tend to
emphasize prior FCC cases even for supposedly transsubstantive principles such as a standard of review.83 As a result, the verbal formulations of the relevant principles, and
perhaps the actual meaning of the principles, can become differentiated by agency.84 Levy and Glicksman further opine that
these ―precedential silos‖ develop partly due to attorney specialization and judges‘ rational attempts to manage decisionmaking costs.85
Related dynamics may help to explain why courts so quickly picked up on the change announced in Mayo Foundation.
Tax law has a specialized bar on both the government and taxpayer side, and those specialists would learn of the Mayo
Foundation decision right away through tax blogs, listservs,
and the like.86 And because the newly applicable Chevron regime should be somewhat more deferential than the previous
regime of National Muffler,87 the attorneys at the Tax Division
of the Department of Justice would have the incentive to advise
courts of the new development quickly, even in cases that had
already been briefed and argued. And, in fact, that is just what
those attorneys did, filing post-briefing letters advising the relevant courts of the change in law.88 Although Levy and Glicksman use their account of information costs and specialization to
explain why a general principle can remain stuck in a precedential silo and fail to diffuse into the broader precedential
83. See id. at 526–34.
84. Id. at 499–500.
85. Id. at 557–63.
86. See, e.g., Alan Horowitz, Supreme Court Opts for Chevron Analysis of
Treasury Regulations, Discarding the Traditional National Muffler Dealers
Analysis, TAX APP. BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011), http://appellatetax.com/2011/01/11/
supreme-court-opts-for-chevron-analysis-of-treasury-regulations-discarding
-the-traditional-national-muffler-dealers-analysis.
87. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562
U.S. 44, 53–58 (2011) (distinguishing between the two standards).
88. For example, in Burks v. United States, the government filed a letter
advising the Fifth Circuit of Mayo Foundation the day after Mayo Foundation
was decided. Rule 28(j) Letter from Tax Division, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Burks
v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2011) (No. 09-11061).
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network, those same considerations can also help to explain
why a case like Mayo Foundation, which was tax-specific,
spread so rapidly within the tax silo.
In short, several factors plausibly contributed to Mayo
Foundation‘s quick assimilation by the lower courts: the
Court‘s own self-consciousness about making a change, the relative simplicity of the new rule, the nature of the canon, and
the canon‘s link to a specialized field. Of course, it is hard to
form solid generalizations based on one case, and in any event
generalizations are not always possible. But we have other examples that can also offer some insight on how interpretive regimes evolve and propagate through the hierarchy—or, as we
will see in the next few parts, don‘t.
IV. FIXED CANONS
The example of Mayo Foundation shows the interpretive
system at the height of its dynamic potential. The Supreme
Court changed a canon, and the lower courts turned on a dime,
responding instantly and accurately to the shift. This part and
the next part of the Article consider some circumstances and
examples in which, for various reasons, such responsiveness is
absent. Part V will examine several instances in which the frequency of canon use in the lower courts seems disconnected
from the canons‘ use in the Supreme Court. This Part considers
how features of certain canons limit their mutability. For certain canons, it is almost inconceivable that the Court could attempt to abolish or meaningfully modify them. The Supreme
Court would not purport to do so, and if the Court did appear to
do so, the lower courts would not believe it. In that sense the
meaning of some canons is fixed.
For a noteworthy recent illustration of the static nature of
some canons, consider Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons.89 A federal prisoner alleged that prison employees had lost or destroyed some of his personal property, and he sued for damages. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the government‘s
immunity for certain torts, but it also has many exceptions.
The question in Ali was whether an exception regarding property claims against ―any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer‖ included claims against literally
any law enforcement officer, including the prison employees involved in Ali.90 Although prison guards are certainly ―other law
89. 552 U.S. 214 (2008).
90. Id. at 216.
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enforcement officer[s]‖ when that phrase is considered in isolation, one could attempt to limit the phrase on the basis of
ejusdem generis, the familiar linguistic canon providing that a
general phrase at the end of a list encompasses only further instances of the same type as those specifically mentioned.91
Here, ejusdem generis would suggest that the statute encompasses only other officers of a type similar to those listed (i.e.,
officers involved in customs enforcement, revenue collection,
and the like), not literally any other law enforcement officer.
In Ali, the Supreme Court majority rejected the ejusdem
generis argument, reasoning (in part) that this statute did not
involve ―a list of specific items separated by commas and followed by a general or collective term.‖92 ―The absence of a list of
specific items,‖ the Court continued, ―undercuts the inference
embodied in ejusdem generis that Congress remained focused
on the common attribute when it used the catchall phrase.‖93
Justice Kennedy‘s dissent, joined by three other Justices,
disagreed with the result but, more interestingly, also took issue with the Court‘s handling of the canon:
[T]he Court‘s approach is incorrect as a general rule and as applied to
the statute now before us. Both the analytic framework and the specific interpretation the Court now employs become binding on the
federal courts, which will confront other cases in which a series of
words operate in a clause similar to the one we consider today. So
this case is troubling not only for the result the Court reaches but also for the analysis it employs.94

This passage is a bit puzzling. For one thing, it seems to
give the case‘s interpretive reasoning a stricter sort of precedential effect than methodology is usually thought to possess.95
But even setting that aside, what should we think of Justice
Kennedy‘s fears about canonical alteration? Should we expect
the lower courts to read the majority opinion for all it is worth,
treating it as a significant limitation on the canon‘s scope? Or
should we expect them to shrug—or even fail to notice at all?
For several reasons, Justice Kennedy‘s fears seem overblown.
To begin with, ejusdem generis is a prime example of a
practically immutable canon. The canon is deeply entrenched
and, to a significant degree, simply reflects the context-based
91. See POPKIN, supra note 36.
92. Ali, 552 U.S. at 225.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 229 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining that methodological decisions generally do not enjoy ordinary stare decisis effect).
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reasoning that ordinary readers would use even if the canon
had never existed by name. That is not to say the canon is
strong in terms of dictating outcomes. Quite the opposite: this
canon, like many others, is something to consider, an aid to discerning likely meaning, but it can readily be overcome by other
considerations.96 But this weakness paradoxically contributes
to its power. Like the reeds, it bends under the wind and
springs back even as the mighty oak breaks.
We might draw a contrast here to interpretive doctrines
that are obviously artificial and contingent in the sense that
they are self-consciously tended and calibrated by the Supreme
Court. The various deference regimes—Chevron, Mead, and the
rest—are the most obvious examples. No one doubts that the
Court can and does change these rules—the Court grants certiorari precisely in order to do so97—and thus lower courts (and
attorneys and other actors) are alert to the ever-present potential for change. For a canon like ejusdem generis, by contrast,
the lower courts probably consult their own intuitive sense of
the canon‘s gist rather than following the Supreme Court‘s latest verbal formulation.
Given the ejusdem generis canon‘s intuitive rooting and
long pedigree, lower courts would require the strongest of evidence before they would believe the canon has changed in a
meaningful way. The majority in Ali, however, did not present
its opinion as a major statement on the meaning of the canon.
(Justice Kennedy in dissent is the one making that sort of
claim.) The Court did not purport to overrule any cases; rather,
it distinguished the situation at hand from those in which the
canon had prevailed.98 The dissent stated that the majority
―adopt[ed] a rule which simply bars all consideration‖ of the
canon for statutes constructed like the one at issue in Ali.99
More accurate than talk of ―rules‖ or ―bars‖ would be to say
that the majority found the canon unpersuasive in the context.
The statute deviated somewhat from the paradigm cases for
96. See, e.g., Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89
(1934) (―[W]hile the rule [of ejusdem generis] is a well-established and useful
one, it is, like other canons of statutory construction, only an aid to the ascertainment of the true meaning of the statute.‖).
97. E.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1867–68 (2013) (―We
granted certiorari, limited to the first question presented: ‗Whether . . . a court
should apply Chevron to . . . an agency‘s determination of its own jurisdiction.‘‖ (citation omitted)); see also supra Part III (discussing the extension of
Chevron to the tax realm).
98. Ali, 552 U.S. at 224–25.
99. Id. at 230–31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the application of the canon, which involve longish lists of specific items followed by a general term. The Court seemed right,
in my estimation, to think that the argument for limiting a
general phrase gets stronger the longer the list and the clearer
the common theme among the items. A canon like this is not an
on/off switch; instead, it has a core where it is powerful (though
hardly conclusive) and a periphery in which its influence gradually wanes.
Based on the considerations in the preceding paragraphs,
and despite the dissent‘s professed fears, it would be surprising
to see Ali make a major change in the way lower courts use
ejusdem generis. But we need not content ourselves with guesses, for enough time has passed to look for evidence. And that
evidence shows that Ali has not seriously changed the canon.
In the nearly eight years since Ali was decided, the Supreme
Court has cited it as an authority on ejusdem generis just once
(even then only in a dissent),100 and the lower courts‘ reaction
has been modest. True, some cases cite Ali as support for holding ejusdem generis inapplicable to different statutes that are
structurally similar to the one in Ali.101 Other cases discuss Ali
at some length but distinguish it and apply ejusdem generis.102
My admittedly subjective sense is that these cases could have
made the same interpretive moves (perhaps citing something
else) had Ali never existed. Potentially more revealing are some
aggregate citation figures. Through the end of 2014, 383 cases
had cited Ali, but only 11 of them (or 2.9%) include the phrase
―ejusdem generis.‖103 This shows that Ali is mainly understood
as a case about a particular part of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, not a case about a canon.104 (Some cases, by contrast, do
become cases about canons, with Chevron being the most obvious example.) Similarly, only a very small percentage of the
100. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1097 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 634 F.3d 852, 858 (6th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d 153, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2008).
102. See, e.g., United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d
274, 292–95 (3d Cir. 2013).
103. This figure was derived by using the WestlawNext KeyCite feature to
find cases citing Ali and then searching within those results for ―ejusdem generis.‖
104. Ali is one of those rare cases that inspires an article about the broader
role of the textual canons as interpretive tools. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Problem of Canonical Ambiguity in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 44 TULSA
L. REV. 501, 502 (2009). Ali was relatively well-positioned to become a case
about a canon, and yet the judicial response has been muted.
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cases in the lower courts citing ejusdem generis in the years
since Ali was decided cite Ali in any way, no matter how fleetingly. The following table provides the details.
Table 1: Ejusdem Generis Cases in Lower Federal Courts
that Cite Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, by Year105
2008: 2 cases citing Ali out of 56 cases citing ejusdem generis
(3.6%)
2009: 0 out of 53 (0%)
2010: 0 out of 56 (0%)
2011: 2 out of 44 (4.5%)
2012: 3 out of 63 (4.8%)
2013: 2 out of 71 (2.8%)
2014: 1 out of 66 (1.5%)
Total: 10 out of 409 (2.4%)
Contrary to Justice Kennedy‘s fears, then, Ali has not become a major precedent about the meaning of the ejusdem generis canon, at least not yet.
Ali‘s relative impotence is not surprising. Mayo Foundation
had several factors working in its favor, but in Ali several similar factors cut against successful canonical change: lack of clear
intent on the Court‘s part to make a major change, the squishy
rather than sharp nature of the potential change, an intuitively
rooted rather than avowedly artificial canon, and the absence
of a specialized bar.
Although every example may have its own peculiarities,
some of the factors just mentioned are common to textual canons generally. Textual canons often capture some of the truth
about human expression (words derive meaning from surrounding words, different parts of a directive should not contradict
themselves, the same word probably means the same thing
when used repeatedly in proximity, etc.).106 The intuitive rooting of these canons makes them hard to grab onto in order to
stretch or compress or toss aside as one desires. At the same
time, these canons are not outcome determinative, and there105. These figures were derived by searching the WestlawNext ALLFEDS
database for lower-court cases containing both ―ejusdem generis‖ and ―Ali‖ for
the given years, then searching just for ―ejusdem generis.‖ (The search for
2008 was limited to cases decided after Ali came down.) The searches returned
a few false positives (such as other cases or litigants named ―Ali‖), which I discarded. It appears that only one state case has ever cited both ejusdem generis
and Ali: Warren v. State, 755 S.E.2d 171, 173 n.2 (Ga. 2014).
106. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 54, at 51.

BRUHL_5fmt

518

1/3/2016 1:04 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:481

fore the exact details of their scope do not carry high stakes.
The Supreme Court is unlikely to have much reason to wish to
tinker with them, and lower courts would hesitate to read
much into one decision that seems to give them more or less
force. There is no specialized bar that lives and breathes these
canons, and the Supreme Court does not grant certiorari just to
opine on their meaning. Therefore, although Part II showed
that the prevalence of textual canons in the lower courts
changed over time, roughly tracking the patterns in the Supreme Court, the meaning of textual canons resists modification.
Some substantive canons may possess similar tendencies
toward stasis. A number of substantive canons—such as the
presumption against retroactivity, presumptions in favor of using various common-law doctrines as gap fillers, and so on—
reflect preferences for stable, rational law that are intuitive
and appealing, at least to a degree; reasonable people would
indeed hesitate before reading vague or ambiguous statutes to
upset settled expectations and policies, especially policies
grounded in the influence of constitutional values.107 It would
be hard not to bring such expectations to bear regardless of
what exactly the Supreme Court said in its latest case. Further, although many substantive canons are tied to a particular
field of law with an observant, specialized bar, others (such as
those just mentioned) are not.
In sum, many canons—and many textual canons in particular—can be expected to resist conscious modification, either
by the Court itself or as the lower courts perceive the Court‘s
intent. Their position is in that sense relatively static.
V. LOOSE CANONS (THE PROBLEM OF CANON
PROMINENCE)
In Part III, we saw a case in which the lower courts responded to the Supreme Court like an attentive dance partner,
quickly and accurately picking up on a change in direction.
Part IV has just explained that such shifts in meaning are hard
to imagine for certain canons, whatever the Court might say
about them. But in other instances we encounter a different
phenomenon, neither quickness nor stasis but a certain kind of
slack. A canon‘s standing in the lower courts need not be very
107. Cf. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 927 (1992) (observing that many canons, both linguistic and substantive, reveal ―a preference for continuity over change‖).
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tightly yoked to its prominence in the Supreme Court‘s decisions. This slack can manifest itself in the form of overreactions, such as when a few mentions from the Supreme Court
bump up a canon‘s salience and then it takes off in the lower
courts. Slack can also manifest itself in the form of underreactions, such as when the lower courts are slow to notice a
canon‘s disappearance. Let us begin there.
A. GHOSTS AND ZOMBIES
In the M. Night Shyamalan film The Sixth Sense, a boy can
see dead people, ghosts of the recently departed. The twist is
that some of the ghosts, including (spoiler alert!) the other
main character, a child psychologist played by Bruce Willis,
don‘t yet realize they are dead.108
Perhaps something similar is true of some canons of interpretation. Their vitality is questionable because the Supreme
Court has not cited them in decades despite many opportunities to do so, yet these ghost canons linger on in the lower
courts as if unaware of their own demise. Moreover, there may
be some canons—we could call these zombie canons—that the
Supreme Court has affirmatively tried to kill, yet still they
stalk the pages of the Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement, undead.
The following sections discuss two canons that might fall
into the ghost or zombie categories, but it is worth explaining
why this discussion does not include one very famous canon,
namely the rule of lenity, which provides that unclear penal
statutes are construed in favor of the accused. It is true that
some commentators, and recently Justice Scalia too, have questioned whether the rule of lenity has any force in the contemporary Supreme Court.109 Yet the Court‘s treatment of the canon
falls short of an outright repudiation or even an unspoken
abandonment. The rule of lenity rarely carries the day, but the
Court cites it regularly, and in fact the canon has played a significant supporting role in a few major pro-defendant rulings in

108. THE SIXTH SENSE (Hollywood Pictures & Spyglass Entertainment
1999).
109. E.g., Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2281 (2014) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (asking whether his colleagues still regard lenity as a ―genuine
part of our jurisprudence‖); Rick Hills, Why Do I Waste My Time Teaching the
So-Called “Rule of Lenity”?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 22, 2011, 4:28 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/03/why-do-i-waste-my-time
-teaching-the-so-called-rule-of-lenity.html.
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recent years.110 Even the most attentive agent would have
trouble reading the Court‘s signals, and it would be surprising
to see lower courts abandon such an ancient canon without
very clear evidence. This is not to say that the lower courts‘
treatment of lenity—in particular the canon‘s potential to become a zombie—is unworthy of study,111 but for the present we
should focus on the much cleaner cases presented by canons
that the Supreme Court has abandoned or worse.
1. The Slow Fade (and Nascent Transformation?) of the CivilRights Canon
Is there a substantive canon governing the interpretation
of civil-rights statutes, such as Title VII, Section 1983, and the
Voting Rights Act? I have always thought that there is such a
canon and that it provides that civil-rights statutes are to be
broadly construed to effectuate their remedial purposes. Various sources report such a canon,112 and it is easy to find the
canon recited in older Supreme Court cases.113 At the same
time, I have had the sense that this canon is not what it used to
be, perhaps that it has slipped into disuse. There are other
canons that the Court has also neglected of late—the old canon
favoring Indian tribes, for example, has practically no purchase

110. E.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410–11 (2010) (interpreting the federal ―honest services‖ fraud statute); United States v. Santos, 553
U.S. 507, 513–14 (2008) (plurality opinion) (interpreting a federal moneylaundering statute).
111. My sense based on some initial research is that lower courts have not
reduced their use of the canon; if anything, it is cited more today than it was a
decade ago. Studying the rule of lenity presents some greater challenges than
one encounters with other canons, including major changes in docket composition, large numbers of unpublished criminal decisions, varying formulations of
the rule, and large numbers of ―negative‖ citations of the canon (i.e., cases that
deem it inapplicable). I hope to return to the rule of lenity in future work.
112. See 3B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 76:6, at 178 (7th ed. 2011) (stating that courts ―now generally agree . . . that civil rights acts are remedial and
should be liberally construed,‖ though also noting prior contrary authority
(footnote omitted)); see also Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(referring to ―the oft-repeated statement that Title VII is remedial in character and should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes‖).
113. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 120 (1981); Gomez
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,
765–66 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 684–86 (1978); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208
(1974).
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on the Court today114—but the civil-rights canon provides an
especially significant object for study because it could be cited
in so many cases.
To probe the intuition that the canon has been in decline in
the Supreme Court, I ran some rather broad electronic searches
of the Court‘s opinions and consulted the secondary literature.
Although it is hard to speak definitively about such matters,
given that it is sometimes debatable whether a canon is being
invoked, it appears that the liberal-construction canon for civil
rights no longer exists at the Supreme Court level. Probably
the last clear invocations of the canon in Supreme Court majority opinions came almost twenty-five years ago, in two 1991
cases, Chisom v. Roemer and Dennis v. Higgins. In Chisom v.
Roemer, which concerned the Voting Rights Act, the Court cited
and quoted an earlier case for the proposition that the Act
―should be interpreted in a manner that provides ‗the broadest
possible scope‘ in combating racial discrimination.‖115 In Dennis
v. Higgins, which concerned whether Commerce Clause challenges could be brought under Section 1983, the Court quoted
prior admonitions that Section 1983 ―must be broadly construed‖ and that its legislative history contemplates that the
statute should be ―liberally and beneficently construed.‖116 But
since 1991, the liberal-construction canon, which had already
been in retreat in the preceding years, has gone silent, at least
in the Court‘s majority opinions.117 Indeed, regarding the Voting Rights Act in particular, the most striking interpretive development of recent years has been the development of a counter-canon restricting the statute‘s coverage so as to avoid
federalism concerns.118
114. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 413–14 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority ―ignores the ‗principle deeply rooted in
[our] Indian jurisprudence‘ that ‗statutes are to be construed liberally in favor
of the Indians‘‖ (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992))).
115. 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
116. 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991) (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989), and Monell, 436 U.S. at 684).
117. For a mention in a dissent, see, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women’s
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 342 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202–
07 (2009) (broadly construing an exception to the Voting Rights Act‘s coverage
in order to avoid constitutional difficulties). Those constitutional worries
turned into a full-fledged ruling of partial unconstitutionality in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621, 2631 (2013).

BRUHL_5fmt

522

1/3/2016 1:04 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:481

Again, it is hard to pinpoint a canon‘s time of death, and it
is not as if a civil-rights plaintiff has not won a debatable statutory interpretation case in the Supreme Court since 1991.119
Recall that we are considering the rules and presumptions that
the Court deploys in its reasoning rather than measuring wins
and losses.120 Still, my judgment on the canon‘s apparent expiration about twenty-five years ago does not stand alone. Ruth
Colker, in a study of the federal courts‘ interpretations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, likewise concludes that the
canon met its ―demise‖ during the Rehnquist Court, with Chisom representing its last gasp, and that the canon has since
been ―abandoned.‖121 The demise of the civil-rights canon is an
aspect of the broader decline, noted by others, of various canons
that traditionally called for the expansive interpretation of various sorts of ―remedial‖ legislation.122
Nonetheless, although the Supreme Court has not cited the
civil-rights canon lately, and although the thrust of the Court‘s
jurisprudence over the last few decades has been (with exceptions, to be sure) generally against generous readings of antidiscrimination laws, the Court has never abrogated the broadconstruction canon in so many words. There has been no public
execution, just a withdrawal of sustenance. This raises the possibility that the canon might linger on in the lower courts, at
least for a time.

119. For example, in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the Supreme Court
ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 includes an anti-retaliation remedy, and in doing
so it referred to ―broadly worded civil rights statute[s].‖ 553 U.S. 442, 452
(2008). However, it seems to me that the Court was referring to the breadth of
the statute‘s language rather than invoking a substantive canon of liberal construction of ambiguous language and, further, the Court‘s ruling in CBOCS
West relied heavily on the stare decisis effect of an old decision rather than de
novo interpretation. See id. at 446–52. In any event, any thought that CBOCS
West revived the broad-construction canon would seem to have been put to
rest in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, which refused to apply CBOCS West‘s reasoning to Title VII. See 133 S. Ct. 2517,
2529–31 (2013).
120. See supra Part I.A.
121. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 20–23 & n.98 (2007).
122. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 6, at 690 (―Certain statutes (such as
civil rights, securities, and antitrust statutes) are supposed to be liberally construed—in other words, applied expansively to new situations. [But] these liberal construction canons have not been often invoked by the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 54,
at 364 (referring to the ―false notion that remedial statutes should be liberally
construed‖).
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And linger it has. The liberal-construction canon has not
disappeared from the lower courts‘ interpretive toolkit the way
it has vanished at the Supreme Court. Although there are some
notable exceptions in which courts have noticed the Supreme
Court‘s implicit rejection of the canon, for the most part the
lower courts‘ statements about the canon do not seem to recognize that anything has happened but instead continue to refer
to it as a settled rule, even in the context of the Voting Rights
Act.123 In a sense these lower courts are correct to rely on the
canon, given that precedents have indefinite life and remain
valid and citable until overruled.
Regarding patterns of frequency of citation of the civilrights canon, a complicated and interesting story emerges. Figures 3 and 4 below present some rough, aggregate data regarding citations of the canon in the courts of appeals.124 The figures show that the canon is in gradual decline if one considers
the canon in what could be called its ―traditional‖ form; a newer
form of the canon, however, is vigorous and possibly still gaining strength.

123. E.g., Ohio State Conf. of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 553 (6th
Cir. 2014) (―The Supreme Court has . . . held that the Voting Rights Act
should be interpreted broadly . . . .‖); EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475,
485 (5th Cir. 2014) (referring to our ―‗well recognized‘ practice of liberally construing Title VII‘s requirements in light of the statute‘s remedial purpose‖ (citation omitted)); see also Padilla v. Lever, 463 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (referring to the rule of broadly construing the Voting Rights Act as ―well-established‖ but citing Supreme Court cases
from the 1960s). For a perceptive exception, see Farrakhan v. Washington,
359 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (―In recent years, the [Supreme] Court has repeatedly rejected broad interpretations of the VRA, obviously troubled by the constitutional
implications.‖).
124. It is difficult to study the district courts systematically through electronic databases, so the discussion in the text concerns the courts of appeals.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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Figure 3: Citations of the Traditional Civil-Rights Canon
in the Courts of Appeals, 1980–2014

Let me explain how this figure was derived and then set
out a few cautions about how to interpret it.
To produce this figure, I began with electronic database
searches that sought to find invocations of the canon in what
one might call its ―traditional‖ form—that is, as a rule requiring liberal interpretation of ―civil rights‖ laws generally or the
great 1960s statutes in particular.125 I then reviewed the results and counted any case in which the broad-construction
canon was arguably invoked, even weakly, including in the
form of quotations from prior cases, cases in which the canon
was acknowledged but not followed, and cases in which it was
invoked in dissent, my rationale being that such uses still show
the canon‘s currency as a recognized tool. Consistent with the
approach elsewhere in this Article, the figure above reflects only published opinions.126 Nonetheless, in this instance one
125. The WestlawNext search string was as follows: adv: DA(aft1979) and
OP((―civil rights‖ or ―equal rights‖ or ―title vii‖ or ―voting rights‖ or vra) /30
(broad! or liberal!) /5 (read! or interpret! or constru!)). This yielded over 1000
results, the large majority of which were false positives. The most common
false positive involved statements of the rule that courts should liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants. Nonetheless, although this search cast
the net broadly, it is certainly possible to invoke the liberal-construction canon
without using the search terms above, and so the search is not fully comprehensive. For the meaning of the ―adv‖ prefix in the search, and for the reasons
for using the ―OP‖ limitation, see supra note 37.
126. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
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might hypothesize that a downward trend in citations of the
canon in published cases could simply mean that citations have
―migrated‖ to unpublished cases as the relevant statutes become less novel and better understood. To evaluate that hypothesis, I ran the same searches on unpublished opinions. It
appears that citations have not migrated to unpublished opinions in serious numbers: only two years in the period covered
by Figure 3 had more than one citation of the canon in an unpublished opinion.
In terms of general caveats, any electronic search string
will miss some cases, and judgment calls are involved in reviewing the results. Figure 3 can therefore be treated as illustrating a gradual decline trend but not as presenting an exact
measure for any given year.
A more specific caution about interpreting this figure concerns the role of caseload, as the opportunities to cite the canon
vary according to the number of relevant appeals. A rough
proxy for this ―denominator‖ is the annual number of appeals
in employment discrimination cases, a figure that has long
been tracked by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.127
That figure has sometimes been erratic—it nearly doubled during the 1990s and then turned around and halved during the
first decade of the 2000s—but despite the ups and downs the
number ends up being similar at the beginning and end of the
period shown in Figure 3. In sum, we can be fairly confident
that the civil-rights canon in its traditional form is in genuine
decline in the lower courts, though the drop has been less extreme and complete than the Supreme Court‘s decades-long
abandonment of it—a bumpy downward incline rather than a
cliff.
Whether the Supreme Court played a causal role in this is
harder to say. Although lower courts surely perceive the
Court‘s general attitude toward interpreting antidiscrimination
127. The data are reported in Table B-7 of the Administrative Office‘s annual Judicial Business reports. See Judicial Business of the United States
Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis
-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts (click on the ―Judicial Business‖
link for the appropriate year; then scroll down to ―Table B-7‖ and click ―Download‖) (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (containing reports back to 1997). The best
figure to use is probably the category for ―Private Civil Rights: Employment,‖
which notably includes Title VII cases; however, none of the case categories
tracked by the official statistics exactly mirrors the group of cases captured by
the electronic search.
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legislation (i.e., generally less expansionist than in the past),
my review of many cases does not provide much evidence of the
lower courts expressly noting the Supreme Court‘s abandonment of the canon.128 It is certainly possible that broader ideological or contextual factors simultaneously affected all the
courts, making the whole federal judiciary less hospitable to
broad interpretations. Further, even if the lower courts had no
idea what the Supreme Court was up to, and even if nothing
about the lower courts changed, it would not be wholly surprising to see a decline in canon citations over time. That is because we can conceive of statutes as having a natural lifecycle
in which they generate many novel interpretive questions in
their early years and fewer such questions later. Many of the
major civil-rights laws are aging. Title VII, one of the most important, was enacted in 1964 and saw its last major amendment in 1991 (which was, as it happens, largely a response to
the Supreme Court‘s stingy interpretations in the late
1980s).129 With an old statute, most questions will have been
resolved by Supreme Court or circuit precedent already, which
tends to diminish the need for interpretive sources like canons.130
One can find some contrasting results if one looks for a
slightly different version of the civil-rights canon. There appears to be a nascent trend of increased use of the broadconstruction canon in the interpretation of a different and newer civil-rights law: the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA).131 Though admittedly the numbers are small, the
figure below shows the recent growth of an ADA-focused vari128. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
129. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, §§ 2–3, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (1991) (findings and purpose clauses); H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 87–88
(1991) (criticizing the Supreme Court‘s rejection of the liberal-construction
canon in its recent cases), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 625–26.
130. Cf. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 30, at 224–26 (presenting tentative evidence of a link between statutory age and declining use of legislative
history for several statutes governing the workplace, including Title VII); Law
& Zaring, supra note 30, at 1722–25 (showing that the Supreme Court‘s use of
legislative history generally declined with statutory age, though usage increased again once a statute became more than ninety years old).
131. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213).
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ant of the broad-construction canon. Again, the details of the
search are set out in the margin.132 Because of the small numbers involved in some years, the citations are grouped into fiveyear baskets. In this instance I have included data on unpublished cases, because (unlike in other situations studied in
this Article) they were a substantial portion of the total citations.
Figure 4: Citations of Disability Canon in the Courts of
Appeals, 1980–2014

The pattern illustrated above likely has a few causes. Part
of the explanation is that that ADA is a relatively young and
still evolving statute that continues to generate interpretive
questions. But in addition to reflecting a natural statutory
lifecycle, this canon‘s use is also fueled by non-judicial leadership: (1) the ADAAA contains its own statutory provision calling for broad construction;133 and (2) the ADA‘s implementing
regulations and other administrative guidance also contain
broad-construction directives.134 As a result, some of the cases
are citing those legislative and administrative directives rather
132. The search strategy was like that described above, supra note 125, except for the substitution of ADA-related terms: adv: DA(aft1979) and OP((ADA
or ―americans with disabilities‖ or ADAAA) /30 (broad! or liberal!) /5 (read! or
interpret! or constru!)). As before, I reviewed the results and removed false
positives.
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012) (―The definition of disability in this
chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this
chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.‖).
134. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (k)(2) (2015).
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than a court-created canon. In fact, over the last decade, those
non-judicial sources account for a substantial majority of the
canon references and thus explain much of the canon‘s increasing currency. In that sense, this canon is not directly comparable to the waning traditional civil-rights canon.
There are some interesting lessons here about the complexity of interpretive change. A canon‘s role can evolve over
time as the surrounding legal landscape changes. While the
traditional civil-rights canon is in decline even in the lower
courts, to some degree the canon has simply shifted ground in
light of new circumstances. If one were to combine citations
from the two versions of the canon, the drop shown in Figure 3
would be significantly slowed. Further, the growth of the ADA
canon has not been driven by the Supreme Court. The Court
has not announced a pro-ADA canon; on the contrary, it has
generally read the ADA narrowly.135 Indeed, dissatisfaction
with the Court‘s stingy treatment of the ADA was part of the
motivation for the enactment of the ADAAA,136 and that new
statute‘s liberal-construction directive is now being cited by the
lower courts. The story of the civil-rights canon(s) thus demonstrates a significant degree of slack in multiple dimensions,
with the lower courts lagging behind the Supreme Court in one
way but leading the Supreme Court—at Congress‘s behest—in
another.
One very interesting question, of course, is what will happen when the Supreme Court begins to decide cases under the
ADAAA. Will the statute‘s broad-construction interpretive directive alter the Court‘s interpretive mood? Will it even be cited?
In the civil-rights field, we encountered a canon that has
fallen into disuse in the Supreme Court but that is still hanging on in the lower courts, albeit in a weakened and now evolving form. But, as the next example shows, even negative commentary from the Court might not suffice to silence a canon if
the Supreme Court is not unequivocal and consistent.

135. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002)
(stating that the definition of disability ―need[s] to be interpreted strictly to
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled‖); Colker, supra note
121, at 25 (―[T]he Supreme Court has not cited [the broad-construction canon]
once in interpreting the ADA.‖).
136. ADAAA § 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3553 (findings and purpose clauses).
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2. The Uncertain Future of the Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Canon
Is there a substantive canon governing the interpretation
of statutes conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal
courts? Plenty of reputable authorities say that such statutes
are to be narrowly construed, that is, read so that uncertainty
is resolved against federal jurisdiction.137 The lower courts repeat such a rule in cases both old and new.138 The rule makes
sense, as far as substantive canons go, given that expansive
federal jurisdiction implicates federalism concerns.139 Further,
in the particular context of removal jurisdiction, a presumption
in favor of state-court jurisdiction is said to gather additional
force because of the risk that a case will be swept out of a state
court surely having jurisdiction, proceed to judgment in a federal court lacking jurisdiction, then have to be vacated and remanded.140
Despite its considerable renown, the narrow-construction
canon is not so robust these days in the Supreme Court. When
one examines lower-court invocations of the canon and traces
the line of precedent back to its eventual source in the U.S. Reports, one often ends up (perhaps after several layers of citations to circuit precedent) with rather old Supreme Court cases
like Healy v. Ratta (1934)141 or Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
137. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19 (1981) (―[I]t is a canon of construction that courts strictly construe their jurisdiction.‖), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 6, at 1206 (citing a canon of
―[n]arrow construction of federal court jurisdictional grants that would siphon
cases away from state courts‖); 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3602.1, at 135 (3d ed. 2009) (―It is a familiar
proposition that the constitutional policy of limited jurisdiction requires that
the statutes granting subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts be strictly construed.‖).
138. See, e.g., Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 733 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir.
2013); Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam);
Russell v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 325 F.2d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1964); Kresberg v. Int‘l Paper Co., 149 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1945). Note that there is a
different rule concerning the interpretation of jurisdiction-stripping legislation; restrictions of existing jurisdiction are required to be clearly stated, especially where constitutional concerns are involved. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 298–99 (2001); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000).
139. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1934); Palkow v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 554–55 (6th Cir. 2005).
140. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721, at 66–82 (4th ed. 2009).
141. 292 U.S. at 270 (―The policy of the statute [setting forth a jurisdictional amount] calls for its strict construction.‖).
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Sheets (1941).142 Even though the Court frequently deals with
questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, it is hard to find a recent full-throated endorsement of the narrow-construction canon. In the removal context, where the canon has perhaps always been strongest, the Court in 2003 noted that a litigant
relied on a ―federal policy of construing removal jurisdiction
narrowly,‖ and the Court acknowledged Shamrock‘s language
setting forth such a canon.143 The Court nonetheless went on to
hold that there was removal jurisdiction and, significantly, to
question the continued vitality of the narrow-construction rule
in light of post-1941 statutory amendments to the removal
statute.144
Since then, the Court has continued to deemphasize the
canon through both act and omission. In the non-removal context, the Court‘s most significant encounter with the canon in
the last decade was Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services,
Inc. (2005), which concerned the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the
supplemental jurisdiction statute.145 Going into the decision,
142. 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) (―[T]he policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict
construction of such legislation.‖). For an extreme example of reaching way
back to find support for narrow construction, see Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI
WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 301 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Turner v. Bank of
North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799)), vacated sub nom. Verizon Md.,
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002).
143. Breuer v. Jim‘s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 697 (2003)
(citing Shamrock, 313 U.S. at 108–09); see also Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v.
Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (stating that ―statutory procedures for removal
are to be strictly construed‖ and citing four cases from the 1920s through
1940s).
144. Breuer, 538 U.S. at 697–98; see also Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti
Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 357 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of ―depart[ing] from this Court‘s practice of strictly construing removal and similar jurisdictional statutes‖). Citing Murphy Bros. as
support, Moore’s Federal Practice observes that ―[r]ecent developments have
cast some doubt on the axioms that removal is strictly construed and that a
presumption exists against removal.‖ 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE‘S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 107.05, at 107-26 (3d ed. 2015); see also Bailey v.
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2008) (also reading Murphy Bros. as possibly stepping away from the canon). I am not sure
that Murphy Bros. should have such broad significance, but I do agree with
the general sense that the Supreme Court has been deemphasizing the canon.
The treatise goes on to say, accurately, that ―[n]evertheless, federal courts
continue to recite these axioms [i.e., of narrow construction].‖ MOORE ET AL.,
supra.
145. 545 U.S. 546 (2005). There is, obviously, some judgment being exercised in determining when the Court last seriously addressed the canon. Certainly, there have been plenty of cases concerning subject-matter jurisdiction
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the participants believed the narrow-construction canon was
alive and well. Tellingly, both of the courts of appeals under review in Exxon Mobil cited the narrow-construction rule (though
one ultimately upheld jurisdiction and the other did not).146
The parties opposing jurisdiction featured the narrowconstruction canon in their briefing to the Supreme Court.147
But the Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in both cases and,
more importantly for present purposes, did not cite the narrowconstruction canon, even if only to find it outweighed by other
factors. Instead, the Court said this about the governing interpretive rules:
We must not give jurisdictional statutes a more expansive interpretation than their text warrants, but it is just as important not to adopt
an artificial construction that is narrower than what the text provides. No sound canon of interpretation requires Congress to speak
with extraordinary clarity in order to modify the rules of federal jurisdiction within appropriate constitutional bounds. Ordinary principles of statutory construction apply.148

Now, we should not make too much of this statement; perhaps the Court was simply saying that clear statutory text
should be obeyed, which is about the most ordinary interpretive
principle there is. Nonetheless, given the canon‘s appearance in
the briefing and in many prior cases, the Court‘s admonition to
use ―ordinary principles‖ of interpretation certainly seems like
a step back from the narrow-construction canon.149 Read litersince 2005, including some in which the Court could be said to have given a
strict reading against jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,
209–14 (2007) (construing the period for filing an appeal as jurisdictional and
not subject to equitable exceptions). But here we are considering reasoning
more than outcomes; that is, we are asking whether the canon is a vital and
acknowledged factor in the Court‘s justifications for its decisions.
146. The Court‘s opinion resolved two cases that had been consolidated.
See Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 142 (1st Cir. 2004)
(―The Supreme Court . . . has repeatedly admonished that in light of the burgeoning federal caseload, diversity jurisdiction must be narrowly construed.‖),
rev’d sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546
(2005); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 362 F.3d 739, 757 (11th Cir.
2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (urging the Supreme Court ―to give guidance in applying the ‗substantive‘ canons of statutory construction . . . includ[ing] the directive to construe jurisdictional grants
narrowly‖ (citation omitted)).
147. Brief of Petitioner at 12, Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. 546 (No. 04-70), 2004
WL 2812088; Brief for Respondent at 36, Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. 546 (No. 0479), 2005 WL 139840.
148. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
149. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Context of Federal Jurisdiction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 86 (2007) (―Although some prior
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ally, the passage above could be taken as an abrogation of the
canon: use ―ordinary principles,‖ with no thumb on the scales in
either direction. The Supreme Court itself has not offered clarification, as it has not subsequently cited Exxon Mobil for any
proposition related to the status of the canon. But the Court
has not relied on the canon in the ensuing years, though certainly the Court could have used it in later cases if it wished.
Although I do not feel that it is possible to present solid
numerical data on the prevalence of this canon in the lower
courts during different time periods,150 my sense is that the
lower courts‘ response to the canonical-methodological developments just described has been muted. To be sure, the passage quoted above has not gone totally unnoticed in the lower
courts, for portions of it have been cited as support for projurisdiction propositions.151 Nonetheless, the language does not
seem to have significantly changed the lower courts‘ understanding of the relevant ground rules. Perhaps the most serious
post-Exxon Mobil engagement with the status of the narrowconstruction rule came in Palisades Collections L.L.C. v.
Shorts,152 in which a panel of the Fourth Circuit divided in its
interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), with both the majority and dissent
citing Exxon Mobil and discussing the canon. The majority cited language from Exxon Mobil to the effect that jurisdictional
statutes should not be given an artificially narrow construction,153 but then—showing the canon‘s enduring grip on judicial
Court decisions had expressed favor for interpreting jurisdictional statutes
narrowly, Allapattah opined that jurisdictional statutes should presumptively
be read neither broadly nor narrowly.‖ (footnotes omitted)).
150. I have attempted a few search strategies, but I have found it difficult
to find terms that are capacious enough to capture most invocations while at
the same time not allowing in too many false positives. Therefore, the approach in this section is more impressionistic than quantitative.
151. E.g., Hood v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 681, 697 (S.D.
Miss. 2013) (―The Court additionally finds that [a restriction on jurisdiction]
cannot be read into the statute as urged by the State.‖ (citing Exxon Mobil,
545 U.S. at 558)), rev’d, 737 F.3d 78 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Stein,
No. 05-CRIM.-0888(LAK), 2007 WL 91350, at *15 n.111 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
2007) (―The Supreme Court recently confirmed that Congress need not speak
explicitly to authorize supplemental jurisdiction over additional parties.‖ (citing Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 557–59)). The Fifth Circuit decision reversing the
district court in Hood did not cite Exxon Mobil; on the contrary, it cited narrow-construction language several times. 737 F.3d at 84, 89, 92.
152. 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008).
153. Id. at 330.
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habits—the opinion nonetheless went on to quote and embrace
statements of the traditional narrow-construction canon en
route to denying federal jurisdiction.154 Judge Niemeyer‘s dissent, in contrast, acknowledged the narrow-construction canon
but then quoted Exxon Mobil to the effect that ―the canon cannot defeat the plain meaning of the statutory language.‖155 The
dissent added that the narrow-construction canon was premised on federalism, but that CAFA had already significantly
expanded federal jurisdiction with the aim of altering the federal-state balance.156 All in all, my sense is that the dissent regarded Exxon Mobil as demoting the narrow-construction canon in importance, but not abolishing it, and that the majority
did not regard Exxon Mobil as changing the canonical landscape in any meaningful way.
Palisades is an example of a court seriously engaging with
the canon‘s status, but that makes it unusual. Far more cases
kept mentioning the narrow-construction canon without taking
any notice of Exxon Mobil or other developments at all.157 In
one telling (though admittedly atypical) example, a district
court referred to the narrow-construction canon and cited as
support, perhaps unwittingly, a dissent from the Eleventh Circuit‘s denial of rehearing in Exxon Mobil158—without mentioning the Supreme Court‘s subsequent decision, which, as we
have been discussing, most certainly did not invoke the canon
and, arguably, disapproved it.

154. Id. at 332–34, 336 & n.5.
155. Id. at 341 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 341–42.
157. See, e.g., Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 733 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir.
2013); Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat‘l Ass‘n, 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007);
In re Olympic Mills Corp., 477 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007); Arroyo v. FDIC, 961 F.
Supp. 2d 386, 390 (D.P.R. 2013); Driskell v. Thompson, 971 F. Supp. 2d 1050,
1059 (D. Colo. 2013); Brown v. Berhndt, 1:12-CV-00024-KGB, 2013 WL
1704877, at *8 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 19, 2013); Osuch v. Optima Mach. Corp., No.
CIV 10-6101, 2011 WL 2708464, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2011); Makro Capital
of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 543
F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2008). The canon remains particularly potent and oftcited when it comes to removal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Barbour v. Int‘l Union,
640 F.3d 599, 605, 614 (4th Cir. 2011); Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc.,
577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322,
1328 (11th Cir. 2006); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1094–95
(10th Cir. 2005).
158. RES–GA Four L.L.C. v. Avalon Builders of GA L.L.C., No. 5:10-CV463 (MTT), 2012 WL 13544, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2012).
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Why didn‘t Exxon Mobil or other recent developments
make a bigger splash? One important factor is that the narrowconstruction canon has a long history of frequent citation in the
lower courts, so it would be surprising to see many lower courts
change their priors based on language in a Supreme Court
opinion that was only ambiguously repudiatory. An emphatic,
self-conscious disavowal of the sort we saw in Mayo Foundation159 would produce a quicker and more complete effect, or so
one would suspect.
We may now have the chance to find out. In December
2014, in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, L.L.C. v.
Owens,160 the Supreme Court expressly repudiated the narrowconstruction canon insofar as it might apply in the context of
cases involving CAFA. The case concerned the required contents for a notice of removal to federal court, and it was abundantly clear that the lower court had erred by imposing an excessive evidentiary burden on the party seeking to invoke
federal jurisdiction.161 Given the obvious nature of the lower
court‘s misunderstanding of removal requirements, it was perhaps unnecessary for the Court to address the canon at all, but
it did so anyway:
[The lower court] relied, in part, on a purported ―presumption‖
against removal. We need not here decide whether such a presumption is proper in mine-run diversity cases. It suffices to point out that
no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which
Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in
federal court.162

For good measure, the Court then cited a portion of CAFA‘s legislative history stating that the statute‘s ―provisions should be
read broadly,‖163 i.e., contrary to the traditional canon. Dart
Cherokee must count as a clear repudiation of the canon in the
CAFA context. Moreover, it is surprising, in light of longstanding principles, that the Court would refer to the presump-

159. See supra Part III (discussing the lower courts‘ reception of Mayo
Foundation).
160. 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014).
161. The case was decided five to four, but the dissenters did not endorse
the lower court‘s understanding of the removal statute on the merits but rather disputed whether the Supreme Court could reach the issue.
162. Id. at 554 (citation omitted).
163. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), quoted in Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct.
at 554.
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tion against removal in its more general form as merely a ―purported‖ rule.
If one digs a little deeper, one finds that Dart Cherokee
holds other surprises too. It turns out that the traditional narrow-construction canon had become the target of an interestgroup campaign. An amicus brief filed by the Washington Legal
Foundation and other pro-business groups in Dart Cherokee
took as its main purpose the aim of ―urg[ing] the Court to
strongly disavow the existence of a presumption against removability.‖164 An op-ed continued the campaign, stating that
the case ―provides the Court an ideal opportunity to end the
rule of construction whereby federal courts continue to narrowly construe federal removal statutes against the party seeking
removal.‖165 That the canon should come under attack becomes
comprehensible when one considers that matters of jurisdiction
and forum selection often have a political valence166—and that
today civil defendants generally find the federal courts a friendlier forum than (some) state courts.167
Another interesting feature of the attack on the narrowconstruction canon is the way it shows that the Supreme Court
is not the only player in the interpretive game. Litigants and
other interested parties, especially repeat players, will pursue
rulings addressing broadly applicable interpretive rules, not
just individual case outcomes. Attorneys (and courts too, for
that matter) can be ―canon entrepreneurs‖ rather than just
passive readers of the Supreme Court‘s sometimes-ambiguous
instructions.
What does the future hold for the traditional narrowconstruction canon?168 As the Supreme Court recognized in
164. Brief of Washington Legal Found., Int‘l Ass‘n of Def. Counsel, and
Fed‘n of Def. & Corp. Counsel as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24,
Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. 546 (No. 13-719), 2014 WL 2361914; see also id. at 2
(―Amici are concerned that unless the Court uses this case not only to overturn
the decision below but also to explain that the lower courts‘ recognition of a
presumption against removal is unfounded, many federal courts will continue
to adhere to such a presumption.‖).
165. Rich Samp, High Court Should Not “DIG” Dart Cherokee Basin Case,
FORBES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/10/21/high-court
-should-not-dig-dart-cherokee-basin-case.
166. See Judith Resnik, Trial As Error, Jurisdiction As Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 979 (2000).
167. See Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the
Conflict of Laws, 70 LA. L. REV. 529, 532–33 (2010).
168. I explore this issue in greater depth in future work. Aaron-Andrew P.
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Dart Cherokee, CAFA is a strong congressional statement in
favor of expanding federal jurisdiction, a purpose at odds with
the state-protective rationale that has traditionally supported
the narrow-construction canon.169 Indeed, some CAFA cases
are employing a canon according to which CAFA‘s general jurisdictional grant should be read broadly and the exceptions to
that grant should be construed narrowly.170 CAFA is probably
the most significant recent jurisdictional statute, and it will
continue to generate interpretive questions into the foreseeable
future, so its pro-federal thrust augurs poorly for the health of
the traditional narrow-construction canon.
Neither the Supreme Court‘s ambiguous rejection of the
narrow-construction canon in Exxon Mobil nor the Court‘s general neglect of the canon in the years before and after made
much of an impact, but the early evidence shows that Dart
Cherokee is having a greater effect on the lower courts, though
perhaps not a revolutionary one.171 Some courts very quickly
picked up on Dart Cherokee‘s abrogation of the canon in the
CAFA context.172 Some other decisions, however, have continued to cite the strict-construction canon even in CAFA cases,
without acknowledging Dart Cherokee.173 That some courts
might not immediately assimilate a new decision is not surprising, though it does stand in contrast to the reception of Mayo
Foundation‘s change in tax law, which was remarkably immediate.174 Perhaps more surprising than the cases that overlook
Dart Cherokee altogether are the CAFA decisions that show
awareness of Dart Cherokee by citing it for some proposition
Bruhl, Retiring the Jurisdictional Canon (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
169. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
170. E.g., N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. HarborView Mortg. Loan
Trust 2006-4, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584–85, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
171. The Court‘s statement repudiating the canon was selected as a headnote by West‘s attorneys, which should promote its transmission. The Court‘s
statement about the canon in Exxon Mobil, by contrast, was not so selected.
172. E.g., Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2014);
Yocupicio v. PAE Group, L.L.C., No. CV 14-8958-GW, 2014 WL 7405445, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2014), rev’d, 795 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2015).
173. E.g., Page v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-01333-MCEKJN, 2015 WL 966201, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015); Levanoff v. SoCal
Wings L.L.C., No. SACV 14-01861-CJC, 2015 WL 248338, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
16, 2015); Robinson v. Avanquest N. Am. Inc., No. 14 C 8015, 2015 WL
196343, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2015).
174. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
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but that nonetheless still recite the traditional narrowconstruction canon.175 These courts apparently read Dart Cherokee for its main holding—that is, clarifying a rule about the
necessary contents of a notice of removal—but fail to notice
that it changes the interpretive regime. Inertia and habit are
powerful, as we have now seen in several contexts.
B. RUNAWAY CANONS
We have just examined situations in which the lower
courts were slow to react to changes in the Supreme Court‘s interpretive regime. Yet the opposite scenario—overreaction instead of underreaction—is possible too. With minimal prompting from the Supreme Court, a canon can take off in the lower
courts. Once the Court puts a canon into the interpretive
toolkit, even accidentally, it can take on a life of its own. Instead of zombies, some canons are, in this respect, like pathogens that escape from the lab. After entering the wild, their
patterns of use need not be very closely linked to way the Supreme Court uses them. This Section discusses two examples,
the first involving one of the most famous interpretive rules
and the second involving a decidedly less prominent canon.
The first example of canonical overreaction is the doctrine
of Chevron deference, which famously requires that courts follow reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes,
even where the court would have reached a different interpretation on its own.176 The Supreme Court‘s 1984 decision in
Chevron was not, at first, the historic emblem it has become. As
Thomas Merrill‘s history of the Chevron decision explains, the
opinion was not regarded as a landmark precedent by its author or by the other justices who joined it.177 Instead, Justice
Stevens described his opinion merely as restating existing
law.178 The Court did not treat Chevron as a major precedent in
175. E.g., Kidner v. P.F. Chang‘s China Bistro, Inc., No. CV 15-287 JGB
KKx, 2015 WL 2453523, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2015); Leon v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 1055, 1072 n.40 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Baker v. PDC Energy,
Inc., No. 14-CV-02537-RM, 2014 WL 7445626, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2014).
176. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–44 (1984).
177. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, in
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 164, 165, 183, 185–86 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011).
178. Id. at 186.
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the following term‘s cases, and indeed the Court used Chevron
only inconsistently for years.179 The earliest discussions in the
lower courts did not regard the decision as revolutionary either.
Notably, then-Judge Stephen Breyer of the First Circuit wrote
two decisions citing Chevron in the early months, and both of
them treated Chevron as no big deal.180
How then did this little case become great? By ―accident,‖
according to Merrill.181 And, more interestingly, as a more recent study by Gary Lawson and Stephen Kam further details,182 not through the Supreme Court‘s own doing. Rather,
certain D.C. Circuit judges picked up on the framework and began giving it a broad reading as a generally applicable precedent on the standard of review.183 The emerging Chevron doctrine, taking on a life beyond the humble Chevron case, then
migrated back to the Supreme Court via former D.C. Circuit
judges like Antonin Scalia and incoming Supreme Court clerks
schooled in Chevron during previous clerkships on the D.C.
Circuit.184 Only then did the decision catch on in the Supreme
Court—and not without some resistance from its author185—
but by that time the contagion had already taken hold in the
lower courts. Even today, Chevron probably plays a more significant role in the lower courts than in the Supreme Court.186
The story of Chevron presents an interesting dynamic in
which a change was driven from below and later embraced (if
179. Id. at 186–87; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980–84 (1992) (measuring invocations of
Chevron from its birth through the 1990 term).
180. Here I draw on Gary Lawson and Stephen Kam‘s recent article on
Chevron‘s reception in the lower courts. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam,
Making Law out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 33–38 (2013).
181. Merrill, supra note 177, at 193.
182. Lawson & Kam, supra note 180.
183. See id. at 39–59; Merrill, supra note 177, at 189–91. Judge Patricia
Wald was perhaps the most crucial early adopter. See Merrill, supra note 177,
at 190. A second factor that promoted Chevron‘s emergence, according to Merrill, is that executive branch lawyers realized the decision‘s pro-government
potential and pushed it on the courts in their briefing. See id. at 191–92.
184. Merrill, supra note 177, at 187–88.
185. Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (Stevens,
J.) (calling the question before the Court ―a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide‖), with id. at 455 (Scalia, J., concurring) (―In
my view, the Court badly misinterprets Chevron.‖).
186. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to
Agency Interpretations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 758–60 (2013).
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only incompletely) by the Supreme Court. A second example of
an overshooting canon involves less back-and-forth interaction
and lower theoretical stakes but similarly illustrates a situation in which a canon takes off in the lower courts with slight
and unpremeditated encouragement from the Supreme Court.
Recall, from Part II, that the prevalence of several established
linguistic canons in the lower courts moved roughly in tandem
with trends on the Supreme Court. But consider the behavior of
the least cited of those canons: the rule of the last antecedent,
which provides that a qualifying phrase modifies only the item
immediately preceding it.187 The rule is old but not especially
often invoked: during the twentieth century the Supreme Court
could go decades at a time between mentions of it. Then, since
about 2000, the Court has been mentioning it every few years,
though never more than once per year. The last decade has also
seen the canon practically explode in popularity in the lower
courts, its prevalence increasing severalfold and outpacing the
overall growth in use of linguistic canons. Now, to be sure, talk
of an explosion should not be taken too far when the raw numbers are small. But still, it is a rather surprising development.
The Supreme Court sneezed, and, as Figure 5 illustrates, the
lower courts seem to be catching a cold. And the virus is, of all
things, an obscure and weak grammatical canon.188

187. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (describing the rule of
the last antecedent).
188. See Jeremy L. Ross, A Rule of Last Resort: A History of the Doctrine of
the Last Antecedent in the United States Supreme Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 325,
336 (2009) (―[A]pplication of the [rule of the last antecedent] is flexible,
and . . . it is typically applied only where there is no contraindication from
[other sources].‖).
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Figure 5: Rule of the Last Antecedent, Annual Citations:
1975–2014189

As always, one needs to be cautious about making causal
claims about the lower courts‘ citation patterns, but here there
is at least some basis for thinking that the Supreme Court is
responsible for the growth in citations and, moreover, that the
influence can be traced to a particular decision. The Supreme
Court‘s 2003 opinion in Barnhart v. Thomas, authored by Justice Scalia, engaged in an unusually extended discussion of the
rule and included a memorable commonsensical illustration involving a teenager‘s misbehavior.190 Of the fifty-two reported
court of appeals cases invoking the rule of the last antecedent
in the decade since Barnhart, a rather impressive thirty-six of
them (sixty-nine percent) cited that case as support for the ancient canon.191 None of the Supreme Court‘s other recent uses
189. The search results shown here are a subset of the aggregate figures
described above. See supra Part II. The WestlawNext search was: adv:
OP(―last antecedent‖ /p (statut! or act or legislat! or congress! or ―U.S.C.‖)),
with the results then disaggregated by year and limited to published opinions.
190. The Court gave the example of parents warning their teenage son that
he should not ―throw a party or engage in any other activity that damages the
house.‖ Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 27. Under the rule of the last antecedent, the
qualifying phrase about damage to the house modifies only ―other activity,‖
such that parties are flatly banned regardless of damage. Id. at 27–28.
191. Barnhart was decided on November 12, 2003. The figures in the text
were generated by (1) running a search in the court of appeals database for:
adv: OP(―last antecedent‖ /p (statut! or act or legislat! or congress! or
―U.S.C.‖)) & DA(aft 11-12-2003 and bef 2015); (2) limiting to published cases;
(3) then using the ―search within results‖ feature to search for ―Barnhart /3
Thomas.‖ As for what explains the canon‘s increased prominence in Supreme
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of the canon has been cited as an authority on the canon nearly
as much.192 In particular, although the Supreme Court cited
the rule of the last antecedent (without following it) in its 1993
decision in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,193 that decision was cited in only four out of twenty-six (fifteen percent) of
the uses of the last-antecedent canon in reported decisions of
the courts of appeals in the decade between Nobelman and
Barnhart.194
It is understandable that canons might linger on in the
lower courts without much recent support from the Supreme
Court, a phenomenon we observed above in Part V.A. Precedents that have not been overruled remain citable indefinitely,
and one should expect that judges, like everyone else, are creatures of habit. Established canons therefore have inertia.
But why, then, do some canons take off with so little encouragement? It is hard to offer confident explanations given
the few samples available and the many variables potentially
at work. Nonetheless, there are some generalizable considerations that probably play some role. I will return to this topic in
Part VII.A.3 below, but one such factor that is worth mentioning here is whether a canon satisfies the human (and thus judicial) desire to avoid effort—i.e., the desire for mechanisms and
rules that reduce caseloads and ease the resolution of cases.195
Effort aversion could explain some of Chevron‘s runaway success in the lower courts, for it is generally easier to write an
opinion affirming an agency view as reasonable than it is to reverse the agency.196 Deference is, accordingly, an appealing
Court opinions, Caleb Nelson floats the intriguing possibility that the canon‘s
relatively prominent treatment in the leading Legislation casebook influenced
the Court‘s future clerks. CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 225–
26 (2011).
192. The author of a recent study of the rule of the last antecedent has
likewise noted an increase in the canon‘s prevalence in the lower courts and
hypothesized that Barnhart is responsible. See Ross, supra note 188, at 332–
34, 336–37.
193. 508 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1993).
194. To obtain these results, I ran the following search in the court of appeals database: adv: OP(―last antecedent‖ /p (statut! or act or legislat! or congress! or ―U.S.C.‖)) & DA(aft 05-31-1993 & bef 11-13-2003). Then I limited results to published cases and searched within results for Nobelman.
195. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 36–40 (2013) (discussing doctrines and practices that might serve judicial preferences for leisure).
196. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of
Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 90–93 (2011) (suggesting that
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path of least resistance for busy judges who lack the luxury of
the Supreme Court‘s discretionary docket. Another potentially
generalizable consideration is that shifts in docket composition
(such as would accompany the enactment of important new legislation) can increase the need for the substantive canons governing the growth area. But as for the recent popularity of the
rule of the last antecedent, I cannot provide a very satisfying
explanation apart from the above-described possibility that one
particular Supreme Court decision increased the old canon‘s salience. If that is indeed what has happened, few observers
would have seen it coming.
The following Part continues the discussion of factors that
bear on a canon‘s rise, as we examine the birth and first steps
of a new canon.
VI. CANON CRYSTALLIZATION
In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, which
concerned the scope of the EPA‘s authority under the Clean Air
Act, Justice Scalia joined a sensible principle of interpretation
to an evocative metaphor and in so doing christened a new canon of interpretation. Congress, he wrote, ―does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants
in mouseholes.‖197 The ―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon now
occupies a secure, if limited, place in the interpretive landscape.198
To call the canon new is not to deny it had forerunners.
Although Justice Scalia introduced the ―no elephants in
mouseholes‖ phrasing into the interpretive lexicon, he did not
invent the sensible idea that one should hesitate before finding
a serious change in the law or a major delegation of authority
hiding in an unassuming, easy-to-miss provision. The relevant
passage in his opinion cited two previous cases. One of those,
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, concerned whether
the FCC‘s authority to ―modify‖ regulatory requirements permitted it to abolish the requirement that nondominant longother circuits are more deferential than the D.C. Circuit partially because of a
higher docket load).
197. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
198. See generally Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in
Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19 (2010) (discussing and evaluating the canon).
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distance carriers file their rates.199 There the Court had ruled,
again through Justice Scalia, that the agency had no such authority to waive the requirement, reasoning that rate-filing was
a crucial part of the regulatory scheme.200 ―It is highly unlikely,‖ the Court stated, ―that Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—and even more
unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to ‗modify‘ rate-filing requirements.‖201 The
other prior case cited in Whitman v. ATA as the inspiration for
the ―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon was FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., in which the Court rejected the
FDA‘s attempt to regulate tobacco as a drug.202 Justice
O‘Connor‘s opinion in that case ended by citing MCI v. AT&T
and stating that the Court should hesitate before finding that
Congress had delegated authority to an agency to regulate a
matter of great ―economic and political significance‖ through
―cryptic‖ language.203
The advent and early history of the ―no elephants in
mouseholes‖ rule is instructive in a few ways.
To begin with, it illustrates the phenomenon of what we
could call ―canon crystallization,‖ the mechanism by which an
interpretive notion or practice with many possible names comes
to be called one particular thing. In this case in particular, the
name is a memorable metaphor about elephants in mouseholes,
which one would expect to aid the canon‘s propagation. That
capacity to communicate, to stick in the mind and rise quickly
to the lips in the future, is, after all, an aspect of metaphor‘s
genius.204

199. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 220, 224–25 (1994).
200. Id. at 229–31.
201. Id. at 231.
202. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).
203. Id. at 160.
204. Cf. JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE DEHUMANIZATION OF ART AND OTHER ESSAYS ON ART, CULTURE, AND LITERATURE 33 (1968) (―The metaphor is
perhaps one of man‘s most fruitful potentialities. Its efficacy verges on magic,
and it seems a tool for creation which God forgot inside one of His creatures
when He made him.‖). The Scalia and Garner treatise gives names to some
interpretive moves that heretofore have not had a commonly used label, but
most of these attempts at crystallization are far less memorable than ―no elephants in mouseholes.‖ See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 54, at xiii (referring to the ―series-qualifier canon‖ and the ―scope-of-subparts canon‖).
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To measure the effect of crystallization, and of the elephant metaphor in particular, one can compare citations of the
―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon to other ways of expressing
the same basic idea through other language. This can be done
in a few ways. As one approach, one can measure how often
lower courts have cited Whitman v. ATA for the elephant canon
as compared to the same opinion‘s nearby non-metaphorical
language about ―vague terms or ancillary provisions.‖205 The
following table provides data on lower-court citations of the elephant language and the non-metaphorical language; because a
subsequent case can cite both phrasings, the table also shows
how many cases cite only one phrasing without the other.
Table 2: Lower-Court Citations to Whitman v. ATA’s Elephant Canon Versus Non-Metaphorical Language206
Elephant
language:
Elephant
language without
non-metaphorical
language:

66 citations
36 citations

Non-metaphorical
language:
Non-metaphorical
language without
elephant
language:

29 citations
0 citations

The ―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon has been cited
more than twice as often as the non-metaphorical language,
but the stunning fact is that the non-metaphorical language
from Whitman v. ATA has not been cited by itself in any case in
the lower federal courts.207
Another approach is to compare citations of the elephant
language to citations of alternative formulations of the idea
205. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
206. The following searches were run in the WestlawNext ALLFEDS database, with Supreme Court results then excluded:
adv: whitman /p (elephant /s mousehole);
adv: whitman /p (―vague terms‖ or ―ancillary provisions‖);
adv: whitman /p (elephant /s mousehole) BUT NOT (―vague terms‖ or ―ancillary provisions‖);
adv:(―vague terms‖ or ―ancillary provisions‖) /p whitman BUT NOT elephant.
The searches were run on January 2, 2015. I searched the term ―Whitman‖
rather than using KeyCite because the latter strategy returned false positives
due to a headnote that refers to ―ancillary provisions‖ in a different context.
207. The non-metaphorical language from Whitman v. ATA has been cited
twice without the elephant language by the Supreme Court itself. King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015); Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2199 (2011).
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that appear in other sources. The alternative sources obviously
include the passages in MCI v. AT&T and FDA v. Brown &
Williamson that Whitman v. ATA cited as the inspiration for
the elephant canon. Another alternative formulation is the
―major questions doctrine,‖ a phrasing that some academic
commentators have used to express the idea present in these
cases.208 Here again, the elephant language has proven much
more popular than these competitors, at least as judged by citations in lower courts.209
In addition, the early history of the ―no elephants in
mouseholes‖ rule is instructive because it points to another factor, besides verbal crystallization, that plays a role in a canon‘s
propagation: the rhetorical choices of attorneys. The elephant
canon took a while to catch on in the lower courts, but its use
has grown notably over time. The canon‘s ascent has arguably
been fueled more by attorneys than by the Supreme Court. The
first citation of the canon in the federal courts of appeals and
the first citation in the federal district courts, both of which occurred about two-and-a-half years after Whitman v. ATA, came
in cases in which the attorneys heavily relied on the canon, going so far as to mention it by name in headings in the briefs.210
In the first five years of the canon‘s life, it was cited in six cases
in the federal courts of appeals, and at least five of them had
briefs that cited the canon. That is a higher rate of correspond208. E.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 231–47 (2006). The ―major questions‖
phrasing may have originated with then-Judge Breyer. See Stephen G. Breyer,
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370
(1986) (―Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the
course of the statute‘s daily administration.‖), quoted in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
209. A list of the results of searches for various formulations is on file with
the author. Note that the various phrasings of the idea are not precisely parallel in their potential application. The elephant canon got its start in administrative law, and that remains the central application, but it can apply to any
situation in which a major decision is said to be lurking in a minor provision,
thus generating more opportunities for use than, for example, the ―major
questions‖ doctrine.
210. Appellants‘ Opening Brief at 33, NISH v. Rumsfeld, 348 F.3d 1263
(10th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-2089), 2002 WL 32507885; Memorandum of the Am.
Bar Ass‘n in Opposition to the FTC‘s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 10,
Am. Bar Ass‘n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 1:02-cv-01883RB), 2003 WL 24207845.
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ence between briefs and cases than one finds in most later
years,211 perhaps because courts no longer need as much
prompting once a canon becomes more popular. The canon‘s
rise, such as it is, has not been encouraged much by the Supreme Court, for the Court has employed the canon only sporadically. After the canon‘s first appearance in Whitman v.
ATA, it did not appear again in the U.S. Reports at all until five
years later, in 2006.212 Since then it has appeared in the Supreme Court several times but only once more in a majority
opinion,213 for a grand total of three appearances in majority
opinions so far (versus seven appearances in dissents).
These findings are no more than suggestive, but, together
with other findings reported earlier,214 they illustrate the point
that attorneys and other intermediaries play a role in canon
development just as they play a role in the development of the
law more broadly.
VII. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The survey above obviously does not include every arguable instance of the phenomenon of canonical change, nor does it
seem possible that one could deem any sample ―representative‖
of the universe of arguable interpretive shifts. There are many
variables that can plausibly affect the speed and accuracy of
communications through the judicial system, and it is difficult
to isolate them for analysis. Nonetheless, having now reviewed
some of the dynamics and possibilities revealed by our examples, we are in a position to provide some structure to the observations and offer some tentative generalizations. In particular, we can now offer a preliminary answer to the question of
what factors affect how the lower courts react to arguable
changes in the interpretive regime. We also have some new information with which to assess the value of implementing (as
211. Results list on file with author. In trying to find correspondences between canon citations in opinions and in briefs, one should keep in mind that
Westlaw‘s databases have incomplete coverage of briefs, especially in trial
courts; not finding a brief that corresponds to a case citation does not necessarily mean that no such brief existed.
212. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006).
213. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 116 (2008).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88 (discussing the role of government attorneys in bringing Mayo Foundation to the attention of lower
courts) and 164–166 (discussing the campaign against the subject-matter jurisdiction canon).
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some theorists would have us do) a more rigorous system of
methodological precedent.
A. FACTORS BEARING ON LOWER-COURT RESPONSIVENESS
The factors that may influence the speed and accuracy
with which changes in the interpretive regime spread through
the judicial system can be divided into several groups: factors
stemming from the nature of particular canons, factors related
to the type of change at issue, factors deriving from the characteristics of the lower courts, and factors involving the broader
institutional context.
1. Different Kinds of Canons
The canons are typically divided into several broad categories, such as textual canons, substantive policy canons, and
canons about the use of extrinsic sources (notably legislative
history and agency interpretations), with each category then
being further divided into subcategories.215 Some of the discussion above supports certain category-based generalizations. We
saw, for example, that many textual canons possess features
(such as long pedigrees and intuitive rooting) that make their
meanings resistant to fine-tuning.216 Other categories of canons
tend to differ in those respects, with the clearest examples being canons related to Chevron.217
Nonetheless, making generalizations based on which of the
taxonomical categories a canon falls into is not the only way to
proceed—and it probably is not the most illuminating way to
proceed. Any given canon can change in many different respects: for example, it can gain or lose weight in the interpretive scales, it can become more or less frequently cited, and it
can expand or contract in terms of the range of situations to
which it applies. The factors that bear on the success of those
different kinds of changes can cut across traditional categorizations. Therefore, it makes sense to turn our attention to other
kinds of factors that affect the propagation of canonical change.

215. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 6 (categorizing canons in this
way).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 96 and 106.
217. See supra text accompanying note 97.
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2. Different Kinds of Changes
Other things being equal, one would expect that clear and
consistent instructions are more likely to be understood and followed than unclear and inconsistent instructions. Much of the
complaint about the Supreme Court‘s interpretive methodology, of course, is that it is complex and conflicting. But even
when the Court does make up its own mind about some matter,
certain types of instructions about canons are just harder to
convey than others. To aid in generalizing about patterns, and
in making predictions, let us separate out several different aspects of canons that might change. Although these distinctions
admittedly blur at the boundaries, we can distinguish among a
canon‘s existence, its scope, and its power, all of which can at
least in principle be changed.
Existence refers to whether a purported canon is a legitimate interpretive rule. Examples of existential changes in the
interpretive toolkit would include a decision abrogating a particular substantive canon218 and the British judiciary‘s nowrescinded ban on using legislative history.219
Scope refers to the range of circumstances in which the
canon applies. Examples are whether Chevron deference applies to Treasury regulations, whether the presumption against
preemption applies to express-preemption clauses as well as
implied-preemption disputes, and how serious a constitutional
concern about an interpretation needs to be in order to trigger
the canon requiring avoidance of interpretations that raise constitutional doubts.220 The first two examples just given are dichotomous—the canon either applies or not to the specified circumstances—but the third example is more a matter of degree
in that it concerns the precise point along the continuum of
constitutional worries (ranging from fairly insubstantial concerns to grave doubt) at which the avoidance canon kicks in.

218. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63 (discussing the Supreme
Court‘s repudiation of the presumption against jurisdiction in cases under
CAFA).
219. See James J. Brudney, The Story of Pepper v. Hart: Examining Legislative History Across the Pond, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES, supra
note 177, at 259.
220. As these examples may reveal, one can often recharacterize questions
of scope as questions of existence (and vice versa). Mayo Foundation, for instance, could be treated as a ruling about the scope of Chevron deference or
about the existence of a distinct National Muffler regime. See supra Part III.
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Power is a more complicated concept that itself divides into
several sub-characteristics: priority, weight, and frequency.
Priority concerns a canon‘s place in the hierarchy of interpretive sources. Depending on what a high-priority source
shows, the court might not consider any lower-priority sources.
The enacted text holds a high-priority status for many judges
in that facially clear text can preclude any recourse to other
considerations such as legislative history or substantive canons. Another example would be a rule that prioritizes the rule
of lenity ahead of legislative history, such that legislative history cannot resolve textual ambiguity against the defendant.
Weight refers to the strength of a canon in determining
outcomes. It could be that several potentially conflicting canons
all apply in a given case. Some of them, other things equal,
may simply be more powerful than others. Punctuation, for example, is said to be a particularly weak contributor, easily
overcome by other considerations.221 So too with the grammatical rule of the last antecedent, which carries some weight but
frequently yields to other indications of meaning.222
Frequency refers to how often—usually, rarely, never?—a
canon appears in judicial analysis when the canon is arguably
applicable. An example is how often the courts consider practical consequences or legislative history.223 Frequency differs in
kind from other characteristics of canons; it cannot be discerned from what any particular opinion says about a canon,
but rather one can only estimate it from how a court behaves
over many cases.
As already acknowledged, the categories set forth above
are not airtight, but one can nonetheless use them to offer some
generalizations. In particular, we can say that certain canon
characteristics are easier for the Supreme Court to modify, and
for lower courts to perceive modifications in, than others. This
is true whether or not formal rules of stare decisis apply.

221. See, e.g., Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U.S. 85, 91 (1925) (holding that a
comma was not persuasive evidence of legislative intent).
222. See Ross, supra note 188.
223. Obviously, other types of rules, such as rules of priority or existence,
will affect how frequently a given source will appear. For example, if the governing methodology put legislative history off-limits except in narrow circumstances (e.g., in order to confirm that Congress did not intend a facially absurd
meaning), then it would appear very infrequently.
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To begin with matters that are relatively easy to communicate through the system, it seems that rules of existence—e.g.,
a hypothetical rule that legislative history is off limits as an interpretive resource—should be easy to convey, at least in theory. (In practice, the intuitions behind some canons would not be
so easy to eradicate.224) Also on the easy side, other things being equal, are matters of scope that have a dichotomous nature
(that is, the canon either applies or not to specified circumstances). Mayo Foundation involved this sort of change in the
scope of the Chevron doctrine, and it was very successful
(though it benefitted from other favorable circumstances
too225). Likewise, one could predict that the lower courts would
easily pick up on a decision clearly providing that express
preemption clauses are not within the scope of the presumption
against preemption.226 But questions of scope that are nondichotomous, like the matter of what (if anything) Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons said about the proper uses of ejusdem generis,227 are harder to express and understand.
A canon‘s power is generally hard to control and communicate. This is especially true of the frequency dimension of power, because accurately measuring frequency requires looking at
patterns of use over many cases rather than just finding some
language in an opinion. Given the Supreme Court‘s rather
small docket (around seventy-five cases per term, recently),
most canons will appear quite rarely. A big year for a particular canon might amount to several cases employing it, and the
next year the canon might disappear due to random fluctuations. Consider, for example, the familiar linguistic canon
noscitur a sociis, which instructs that a word draws meaning
from the words surrounding it.228 It appeared in zero cases in
the Supreme Court‘s 2008 Term, skyrocketed to three cases in
the 2009 Term, and dropped back to one case in the 2010
Term,229 but surely this evidence does not demonstrate a true
224. See supra Part IV.
225. See supra Part III.
226. Cf. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2189 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with a portion of the plurality opinion applying a presumption against preemption to an
express preemption clause and noting the Court‘s ―sporadic‖ use of the canon).
227. See supra Part IV.
228. POPKIN, supra note 36, at 201.
229. I described my protocol for searching for linguistic canons above. See
supra notes 37–38.
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change in the relative importance of the canon from one year to
the next (though broad-based, sustained patterns over a longer
period could be meaningful).
Adding to the difficulty of accurately perceiving signals
about frequency, what the Supreme Court says about methodology might actually misrepresent the relative importance of
various sources. Based on the official doctrines, one might suppose that the Supreme Court would use Chevron or some other
deference regime in almost every case in which an agency interpretation is at issue—and yet the Supreme Court often does
not even cite any deference regime in many cases in which it
seemingly should, let alone follow the doctrines faithfully.230 In
this way Chevron is not as important on the Supreme Court as
one might gather from the Court‘s official pronouncements. For
an example representing the reverse—that is, a canon that is
more important than the Court lets on—it may be that the
Court considers policy consequences much more often than one
might glean from listening to some of its more formalist and
textualist members.231 To the extent that the Court‘s pronouncements about the relative importance of a canon differ
from its actual rate of use, the lower courts will probably attend more to the pronouncements. Most lower-court judges are
too busy to read all of the Supreme Court‘s cases and recognize
when words and deeds diverge (though perhaps academic studies can help enlighten them). Maybe the Court likes it that
way: it can use its language to tell lower courts what to do,
even if it doesn‘t do as it says in its own cases.
One particular frequency-related problem we have encountered concerns how to silence a canon. If the Supreme Court
expressly abrogates or redefines a canon—as the Court recently
did when it repudiated the narrow-construction-of-jurisdiction
canon for cases arising under CAFA232—one expects that mes230. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 67, at 1090, 1117, 1120–21, 1124–25
(reporting that in a majority of cases involving an agency interpretation, the
Court invoked no deference regime); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Chevron As a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1764–66
(2010) (arguing that the Justices treat deference regimes as flexible presumptions rather than as rigidly binding precedents).
231. See Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007,
1009, 1012–15 (2011) (explaining that consequentialist arguments are common even among textualists).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63.
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sage would be heard relatively clearly. But, as we saw with the
examples of civil rights and earlier decisions on subject-matter
jurisdiction, mere neglect is more difficult for lower courts to
pick up on. Precedents in our system remain valid indefinitely
unless and until overruled. And given the non-mandatory nature of the canons, failure to cite does not equal implicit overruling. At least from the perspective of lower courts, a canon
remains in the toolkit even if the Supreme Court has not pulled
it out for quite some time.
A canon‘s weight, too, is probably hard to adjust in any
very precise way. Pronouncements about a canon‘s weight are
in theory easy to state, but it is unclear what exactly they mean
in practical terms. It is hard to imagine that a directive to give
a certain source or presumption ―great weight‖ versus ―significant weight‖ could have a very precise real-world impact.
(Likewise, it is hard for the researcher to study canon weight,
as distinguished from either citation rates or verbal formulations of canon meaning.) Further, although dissenting opinions
and academic commentators have criticized the Court for its
occasional practice of elevating presumptions into clearstatement rules or even into ―super-strong‖ clear-statement
rules,233 I suspect that such distinctions, though not totally lost
on the lower courts, would matter less in practice than they do
in theory.
The aspect of power that is probably easiest to communicate (again, other things being equal) is priority. An order of
operations is achievable, even if the precise force of each operator is hard to gauge or control. This may well explain the appeal of tiered interpretive frameworks such as the ―modified
textualism‖ described in Gluck‘s study of several state
courts.234 In this three-level interpretive approach, the first
step is limited to textual analysis, including textual structure
and textual canons.235 If the statute is deemed ambiguous, the
court then moves on to the second step, at which legislative history is admissible.236 If that still does not resolve the interpretive question, the court then turns to substantive canons and
233. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 31, at 615–17 (discussing the
evolution of the rule against extraterritorial application of statutes).
234. See Gluck, supra note 4.
235. See id. at 1758, 1829–32.
236. See id. at 1835–36, 1839.
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default rules.237 According to Gluck‘s research, states that have
found the most success in establishing binding frameworks
have often done so by using such tiered approaches, with the
most notable example being the framework employed for more
than a decade in Oregon.238 To be clear, one should not overstate the success of Oregon‘s tiered model. The first step‘s purported ban on considering legislative history in the absence of
ambiguity was abandoned several years ago, ostensibly in response to the legislature‘s disagreement with it.239 And even
while the regime was in effect, some observers of the Oregon
experiment doubted that the facial rigidity of the framework
contributed to actual consistency or simplicity in decision making, in part because the analysis at the first step often involved
a mélange of un-ordered and potentially conflicting presumptions and inferences about likely meaning.240 Still, even a limited and temporary success shows that binding frameworks of
the order-of-operations sort are at least relatively feasible.
3. Features of the Lower Courts
The lower courts‘ receptivity to changes in the interpretive
landscape is another factor bearing on the propagation of canons through the system. Their receptivity to changes likely depends, in turn, on several features, including their own interpretive preferences and needs.
As for preferences, lower-court judges have motivations
beyond just being faithful agents of the Supreme Court.241 Obvious sources of potentially contrary motivations are a judge‘s
own jurisprudential approach and political ideology. Such
commitments can affect a judge‘s views on a wide range of interpretive issues, including the role of legislative intent, the
237. See id. at 1830–31, 1839–40.
238. Id. at 1775–85, 1855–58; cf. Jack L. Landau, Oregon As a Laboratory
of Statutory Interpretation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563, 566–73 (2011)
(concluding that the Oregon framework brought more order to statutory interpretation, though it also suffered from several deficiencies).
239. See State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042, 1046–51 (Or. 2009).
240. See Steven J. Johansen, What Does Ambiguous Mean? Making Sense
of Statutory Analysis in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 219, 220, 251 (1998);
Robert M. Wilsey, Comment, Paltry, General & Eclectic: Why the Oregon Supreme Court Should Scrap PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, 44
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 615, 618–19, 625–28, 664–65 (2008).
241. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 195, at 25–50 (setting
forth an approach to judicial behavior according to which judges are selfinterested employees with multiple goals).
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degree of deference agencies should enjoy, and the value of substantive canons that favor particular groups or interests (civilrights plaintiffs, those seeking exemptions from tax laws, etc.).
Another important type of judicial self-interest, probably
less obvious but potentially very important in the lower courts,
is the desire for mechanisms and rules that reduce caseloads
and ease the resolution of cases.242 As a general matter, we can
expect that lower courts will be especially reluctant to embrace
new doctrines that increase their workload, such as new tests
that involve complex, multi-factored analyses, and that they
will be especially likely to welcome new doctrines that provide
for quick and simple decision making.243 The judicial preference
for leisure might have some important effects when it comes to
statutory interpretation. It could explain some of Chevron‘s
success in the lower courts, for it is generally easier to write an
opinion affirming an agency view as reasonable than it is to reverse the agency, and so deference is an appealing option for
busy judges.244 Moreover, quite apart from the decisional
shortcuts any particular rule might afford, simply having a
regular, established structure for analysis is a benefit all by itself for lower-court judges who deal, as compared to the Supreme Court Justices, with many interpretive problems that
are complicated but lack serious attitudinal stakes. For similar
reasons, the lower courts could be expected, other things being
equal, to be amenable to rules restricting the consultation of
legislative history. A preference for docket reduction might also
explain why the lower courts responded only slowly to the Supreme Court‘s neglect and disparagement of the presumption
against federal jurisdiction.245
As for the lower courts‘ need for various canons, a court‘s
demand for a particular canon depends on the court‘s docket
composition and role in the judicial system. For example, although the ―no elephants in mouseholes‖ canon is catching on in
the courts of appeals,246 it will never be a high-frequency canon,
especially in the district courts. Many suits challenging agency
action skip the district courts and begin directly in the courts of
242. See id. at 36–40 (discussing doctrines and practices that might serve
judicial preferences for leisure).
243. See Tokson, supra note 27, at 912–16, 928–29.
244. See supra text accompanying note 196.
245. I consider this possibility in greater detail in Bruhl, supra note 168.
246. See supra Part VI.
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appeals,247 thus precluding many potential uses at the bottom
of the hierarchy. (Jurisdictional considerations, aided by some
path-dependence and silo effects, likely also explain why the
D.C. Circuit accounts for a disproportionate share of the references to the elephant canon among the courts of appeals.248)
Moreover, the elephant rule is a particularly complicated and
specialized canon (versus, say, most linguistic canons, or even
citations to legislative history). Applying it requires the court to
measure the policy significance of a proposed interpretation
(the potential elephant) and assess the role of a particular
statutory provision (the mousehole) within a larger regulatory
scheme. Such interpretive moves are more likely to be necessary as cases become more complex, and they are more likely to
be feasible as resources become more abundant. Both of those
things happen as one moves up the judicial hierarchy.249 In
sum, the propagation of a canon depends on the environmental
conditions, and different courts provide more hospitable niches
for different canons.
4. Features of the Broader Institutional Context
The propagation of canons through the system also depends on features of the broader institutional context. This context notably includes attorneys and litigants. Courts do their
own research, but attorneys‘ choices about which points to argue and emphasize, and litigants‘ choices about which cases to
bring, play a role in driving legal developments in interpretive
methodology just as they do elsewhere.250 Although this Article
presents only a few suggestive episodes, there is good reason to
247. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2012) (certain orders of the FCC and several
other agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012) (various EPA actions under the
Clean Air Act).
248. Through the end of 2014, the D.C. Circuit has accounted for eighteen
of forty-nine citations in published decisions of the federal courts of appeals.
249. See Bruhl, supra note 22, at 470–79 (contrasting decision making in
the Supreme Court and lower courts in these respects).
250. Valuable recent contributions in this vein include Parrillo‘s work on
the role of New Deal agency lawyers and Washington law firms in pushing
legislative history on the Supreme Court. Parrillo, supra note 30. Plagiarism
detection software has recently been employed to examine the influence of legal briefs on the content of judicial opinions. See Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL.
RES. Q. 468 (2008); Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court
Opinion Language (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2574451.
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believe that attorneys can play the role of canon entrepreneurs,
helping lower courts catch on to new canons (as with Mayo
Foundation and ―no elephants in mouseholes‖) or even waging
a campaign against a venerable old canon (as with the canon of
narrow construction of subject-matter jurisdiction). The structure of the bar could matter as well, as the existence of a highly
specialized bar may have accelerated the system‘s reception of
Mayo Foundation‘s change in the deference regime governing
tax regulations. Additional research into the role of attorneys
and other canon entrepreneurs would be fruitful.
The broader context includes other actors beyond attorneys
and litigants. Congress can play a role in shaping the development of the interpretive regime by enacting new legislation
that then creates a drag on certain canons (as with CAFA‘s
pressure on the traditional subject-matter jurisdiction canon251)
or encourages the growth of others (as with the migration of
the traditional civil-rights canon to the disability context in the
wake of the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act
and amendments thereto252). Congress can also promulgate its
own interpretive canons and act as a competing source of canonical leadership in the lower courts, with the disability context again providing an example.253
Many other factors could potentially play a role in canon
communication and would benefit from further investigation.
The rise of legal blogs and instant electronic communication
does not guarantee that developments will be transmitted to
the lower courts more quickly today than they were in the past,
but such new technologies and media must help. The proliferation of required Legislation and Regulation courses254 could
play a role in communicating the canons to the lower courts by
educating their future law clerks in recent developments.
Books about statutory interpretation such as the one recently
authored by Scalia and Garner,255 the decisions of Lexis and
251. See supra text accompanying notes 160–70.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 131–36.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 133–36.
254. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Ripple Effect of “Leg-Reg” on the Study of Legislation and Administrative Law in the Law School Curriculum, 65 J. LEGAL
ED. 121, 123, 126 (2015) (reporting survey results on recent growth of required
courses in Legislation and Regulation).
255. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 54. The book has already been cited
many times by courts, as a quick search of electronic databases will reveal.
The book‘s popularity with courts is quite striking given that the book is
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Westlaw attorneys about whether to turn opinion language into
a headnote256—the universe of potential influences is vast and
mostly uncharted. The broader point here is that information
does not only flow directly from the Supreme Court down; the
pathways are multiple and are mediated by other actors.
B. THE LIMITS OF METHODOLOGICAL STARE DECISIS
Finally, to return to one of the topics broached at the outset of this Article and touched upon at several points along the
way, the findings here provide some valuable perspective on
the push for greater methodological stare decisis, particularly
in its vertical aspect (that is, the requirement that lower courts
follow the rulings of higher courts). More specifically, the findings show some limits to the utility of the stare decisis project.
First, even in the absence of the ordinary doctrines of precedent, we have seen that the lower courts often at least roughly
follow the Supreme Court‘s lead, both as regards broad trends
(e.g., the textualist shift described in Part II) and more discrete
shifts in interpretive rules (e.g., the Mayo Foundation case discussed in Part III and the recently announced partial abrogation of the subject-matter jurisdiction canon noted in Part
V.A.2). The current system is already semi-precedential, at
least as a matter of the facts on the ground.
Second, and probably more importantly, in those instances
in which the lower courts are not tightly yoked to the Supreme
Court, the culprit does not seem to be the lack of formal doctrines of vertical precedent. Here I do not simply repeat the observation that the Court itself is inconsistent in its approaches,
such that even the most faithful and attentive agent would not
know what to do (though often that is true). Even if the Court
became more consistent, there are deeper problems at work
here. Some canons just do not lend themselves to fine-tuning.
And some changes in the interpretive regime are hard to communicate and perceive, with frequency of canon usage being a
prime example. Making methodology more ―binding‖ would not
solve these problems. If anything, a regime of formally binding
precedent would further encourage lower courts to rely on the
Court‘s potentially misleading pronouncements about the canons rather than following the Court‘s actual behavior. That
avowedly normative rather than descriptive of current practice. Id. at 9.
256. See supra note 171.
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may be a result that the Justices would like just fine, but it
probably is not what the proponents of methodological precedent—who tend to extol rule-of-law virtues like uniformity and
transparency—have in mind.
The foregoing observations do not establish that the methodological stare decisis program is without worth. However,
they do suggest, at a minimum, that the additional headway it
can make is fundamentally limited.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored what happens in the lower courts
when the Supreme Court changes the interpretive regime.
There is no universal answer, but a review of a number of episodes of canonical evolution is illuminating. Lower courts have
the demonstrated capacity to adjust very quickly and accurately to discrete changes in the canonical landscape, and they also
seem to move roughly in parallel with the Supreme Court when
it comes to broader interpretive tendencies. In some instances,
however, there is slippage between the practices in the Supreme Court and the lower courts. In addition, the examples
discussed here provide some basis to form generalizations
about the factors that improve or detract from the system‘s responsiveness to interpretive changes. But one major conclusion
is that there is still much we need to learn. Further research—
examining other canons and digging more deeply into the role
of particular contextual factors—would likely yield additional
insights and move us closer to a complete understanding of how
various canons are communicated through the judicial hierarchy.

